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Abstract 
Approximately 13 percent of the American population are 65 years of age or older 
(Vincent & Velkof, 2010).  Of these 48 million older adults, roughly 5.3 million have 
received a clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Alzheimer’s Association, 
2017).  As the awareness of AD continues to heighten, so does the push for increased 
cognitive screening to identify signs of abnormal aging.  However, important 
considerations pertaining to scale development or weighting procedures applied during 
the test development process remain unclear, as they are often not reported in testing 
manuals.  The current study presents a statistically derived scoring algorithm for a brief 
screening measure of cognition, the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 2 (DRS-2) in a sample 
of 113 older adults (55 Alzheimer’s disease dementia, 58 Mild Cognitive Impairment.  
Logit weights obtained from logistic regression analysis were utilized to re-weight the 
subscales of the DRS-2 to reflect the order of relative importance of the five DRS-2 
subscales.  Sensitivity and specificity rates of the original and logit-weighted DRS-2 
scores were compared to examine the impact of weighting on DRS-2 classification 
accuracy.   Results indicated an increase in sensitivity from 78% to 90% and a decrease 
in specificity utilizing the newly computed logit-weighted scores.  These results highlight 
the importance of scale construction during the instrument development process, 
suggesting that weighting procedures directly affect measurement utility.  Additional 
implications for future clinical practice and research are discussed. 
Keywords: dementia rating scale, neuropsychological assessment, cognitive 
screening, Alzheimer’s disease, measurement 
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Screening for Dementia: An Examination of Subscale Relative Importance 
I. Introduction 
Dementia, an umbrella term referring to symptoms that result from different types 
of brain disorders, has become a familiar word in the healthcare community.  With the 
increasing aging of the baby boomer generation, a call for increased dementia screening 
in primary healthcare settings and earlier, repeated administration of neuropsychological 
testing has been issued as the dementia continues to gain recognition as a worldwide 
epidemic (Boustani, Peterson, Hanson, Harris, & Lohr, 2003; Heller, Scott, Janicki, & 
Pre-Summit Workgroup on Caregiving and Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities, 
2018; Iliffe, Manthorpe, & Eden, 2003; Imtiaz, Tolppanen, Kivipelto, & Soininen, 2014).  
The disease single-handedly threatens healthcare systems and economies worldwide, with 
an estimated $818 billion devoted to dementia care (Prince, Comas-Herrera, Knapp, 
Guerchet, & Karagiannidou, 2016).  Heightened awareness of dementia has resulted in 
increased frequency in the administration of cognitive screening tests and 
neuropsychological evaluations to the aging population.  Thus, the projected rising cost 
of dementia care highlights the importance of the utilization of reliable and valid 
measures to identify changes in cognition associated with a diagnosis of a dementia.  
Improved methods of detecting cognitive deficit in older adults at risk for dementia 
provide the patient, caregiver, and clinician with the appropriate knowledge necessary to 
make critical treatment decisions.  In doing so, the patient’s risk of experiencing 
decreased quality of life as the disease progresses lessens.  Early detection of deficit 
provides a wider range of treatment options for the patient.  Although there is currently 
no cure for dementia, patients diagnosed with AD dementia often benefit from 
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appropriate use of proper caregiver planning, interventions, and pharmacological 
treatments aimed to improve quality of life and other aspects of physical health (Liu-
Seifert, Siemers, Sundell, Price, Han, Selzler… & Mohs, 2014).  Accurate and time 
appropriate detection of cognitive deficit indicative of AD provides patients with longer 
access to these resources in comparison to patients diagnosed later on in the disease 
course.  This often results in a slower progression of the course of the neurodegeneration 
when time-sensitive pharmacological treatments are administered appropriately, as well 
as an increased quality of life reported by both the patient and caregiver (Appels & 
Scherder, 2010; Giebel, Sutcliffe, Stolt, Karlsson, Renom-Guiteras, Sotos… & Challis, 
2014).  For example, research supports the efficacy of Donepezil in slowing the 
progression of cognitive decline associated with AD in the mild and moderate stages of 
the dementia, but not the severe stage (Hashimoto, Kazui, Matsumoto, Nakano, Yasuda, 
& Mori, 2005; Krishnan, Charles, Doraiswamy, Mintzer, Weisler, Yu, … Rogers, 2003).  
In contrast, research supports the efficacy of Memantine in slowing the progression of 
associated cognitive decline in the moderate to severe stages, but not the mild stage 
(Danysz, Parsons, Mobius, Stoffler, & Quack, 2000; Roundtree, Chan, Pavlik, Darby, 
Siddiqui, & Doody, 2009; Wilkinson, 2012).  The temporal association between drug 
administration and treatment efficacy leaves patients diagnosed in the early stages with 
more treatment options in comparison to patients diagnosed in the later stages.  
Therefore, patients in the earlier stages are able to most efficiently take advantage of 
treatment options currently available, subsequently resulting in better treatment 
outcomes. 
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Although neuropsychological evaluation is considered the “gold standard” for the 
diagnosis of dementia, financial and time constraints may prevent many individuals 
access to this form of comprehensive assessment, as it is a costly and time-consuming 
process (Borson, Frank, Bayley, Boustani, Dean, Lin, … & Ashford, 2013; Bradford, 
Kunik, Schulz, Williams, & Singh, 2009).  In such circumstances, access to reliable and 
valid screening measures of cognition becomes a vital determinant of patient health 
outcome.  This trade off, however, comes at a cost, as screening measures are not as 
sensitive to the detection of change in cognitive abilities in comparison to a 
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation.  This is likely attributable to the brevity of 
such screening instruments, as there is a positive relationship between the number of 
questions on any given measure and the reliability of the measure (Peter, 1979).  Short-
form screening exams contain fewer questions than a battery of cognitive tests combined 
to form a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation, resulting in decreased reliability 
of brief screening measures relative to that of complex exams.  
Neuropsychological literature has become increasingly flooded with scholarly 
efforts to improve early detection methods of AD dementia, the sixth leading cause of 
death in the United States (Kochanek, Murphy, Xu, & Tejada-Vera, 2016; Nestor, 
Scheltens, & Hodges, 2004).  These efforts are paralleled by additional efforts to improve 
the overall quality of neuropsychological assessment across various clinical populations 
(Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe, & Burr, 2006; Mitrushina, 2009; Ramsay & Reynolds, 
2000; Vanderploeg, 2014).  Despite vast efforts to improve the validity of measures 
intended to assess cognitive ability, neuropsychological measurement continues to 
receive criticism (Meyer, Finn, Eyde, Kay, Moreland, Dies, Eisman, & Reed, 2001; 
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Retzlaff & Gibertini, 2014; Smith, Breitbart, & Platt, 1995).  More recently, authors of a 
recent study posited that the proportion of subtest scoring of a brief screening measure of 
cognition, the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA), appears unreasonable (Fengler, 
Kessler, Timmermann, Zapf, Elben… & Kalbe, 2016).  Commonly used as a screening 
tool for dementia, Fengler et al. (2016) suggest the current scoring method of the MoCA 
does not align with empirical support for the rank ordering of the cognitive constructs of 
greatest to least importance when used to screen for abnormal cognitive impairment in 
patients with Parkinson’s disease dementia.  Fengler and colleagues (2016) re-weighted 
these subscale scores according to the Areas under the Curve (AUC) in a Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC), and reported a 29.5% increase in sensitivity and a 4.7% 
decrease in specificity.  Ultimately, the authors of this study highlighted the effect of 
differential subtest weighting on test utility, bringing attention to the potential negative 
effects that may be seen if proper consideration is not given to these aspects of 
measurement development (Fengler et al., 2016).   This remains to be one of the only 
studies in the field of neuropsychology examining the effects of subscale weighting.  This 
calls attention to the dearth of literature investigating whether or not changes can be made 
to the structure of neuropsychological tests to improve instrument utility in the clinical 
setting.  Furthermore, little has been published in the field of neuropsychology regarding 
the examination of the quality of test development procedures.  With little to no attention 
devoted to an investigation of the current standards of these procedures, it remains 
unclear as to how these assessments are being created, and why they are being created in 
the ways that they are.  For example, due to the under-reporting of these processes in 
formally published testing manuals, it may remain unclear as to why a test developer 
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devoted ten questions to the assessment of one cognitive construct, but only five 
questions to another.  Why is one subscale worth more points than another, when the two 
subscales contain the same number of questions?  Because these decisions are not 
explicitly reported in the measurement development section of neuropsychological 
testing manuals, one is unable to assume whether appropriate consideration was given to 
these foundational components of the measurement development process.  Ultimately, it 
appears plausible that some of the posited issues related to neuropsychological 
assessment may be deeply rooted within the practices with which these measures are 
initially constructed.  Thus, reactive efforts aimed at improving measures after they have 
already been created and disseminated to practitioners for use may ultimately prove sub-
par, such that revision efforts at this stage may ultimately be considered, “too little, too 
late.”  As such, attempts to increase the reliability of a measure through minor revisions 
of measurement content may fail to address an underlying problem: the construction of 
the measure itself.  Neuropsychological instrument development must resemble a practice 
firmly grounded in measurement theory in order for these tests to reach full capacity in 
terms of reliable and valid clinical utility. 
It is important to note that this may be the case only if test developers are not 
providing appropriate consideration to development procedures during measurement 
construction.  This remains unclear, however, as many neuropsychological instruments 
fail to report important considerations pertaining to measurement construction during the 
test development process in published testing manuals.  For example, the testing manuals 
for two commonly used brief cognitive screening instruments, the Mattis Dementia 
Rating Scale 2 (DRS-2) and the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) both lack 
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detailed information regarding the test development process.  Specifically, it is unclear 
how and why items were generated and selected for inclusion.  No information is 
provided detailing the creation of the scoring methods utilized for both instruments, and 
no reasoning for the use of the current scoring method is included in either of these 
testing manuals.  It is important to note that the test authors may, in fact, have provided 
appropriated consideration to these factors during the test development process.  
However, that possibility remains unclear, due to the exclusion of a description of this 
consideration, should it have occurred during the initial construction of the instruments.  
Insufficient attention to and reporting of measurement scale development (i.e., the 
determination of subscale weights) may leave these measures and the interpretation of 
their scores vulnerable to error, especially when proposed cut scores are utilized to 
inform clinical decisions.  Depending on the degree to which subscale score weights 
differ, poor performance on a lower-weighted subscale will differentially affect the total 
score of the measure more than performance on a higher-weighted subscale.  Increased 
variability among subscale weights may render an individual more susceptible to 
receiving a total score equal to or below the recommended cut score associated with the 
measure, if his or her performance shortcomings are predominantly evidenced on 
subscales maintaining a higher weight, relative to the other subscales within the same 
measure.  In contrast, a wider range of subscale weights may render an individual more 
susceptible to receiving a total raw score above the recommended cut score, if principal 
shortcomings are evidenced on lower-weighted subscales, relative to other subscales.  For 
example, if a measure worth a total of 20 points contains give subscales and maintains a 
recommended cut score of 17/20 total points, the use of differentially weighted subscale 
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scores will result in the subscale with the greatest weight being most influential on the 
outcome of the total raw score, relative to the cut score comparison point.  If four of the 
subscales are scored out of a three possible points, whereas the fifth subscale is scored 
out of eight possible points, getting 50% of the questions correct on the eight-point 
subscale would result in the test-taker falling below the recommended cut score.  In 
comparison, getting 50% of the questions correct on any one of the three-point subscales    
subscales would result in a score above the recommended cut score for the test-taker.  
Ultimately, the total raw score may not appropriately reflect an underlying 50% deficit in 
one area of cognition if a-theoretical differential weighting methods are applied to the 
subtests of an instrument.   
Test developers should give appropriate consideration to the measurement 
development process, and decisions involved in this process should be based on empirical 
or statistical grounds (Baldwin, 2015).  Given the additive nature of composite scores, 
researchers have historically devoted significant attention to the determination and 
analysis of methods aimed to optimize the weighting of subscales (Govindarajulu, 1988; 
Perloff & Persons, 1988; Thompson, 1940; Wang & Stanley, 1970).  Govindarajulu 
(1988) proposed that the assignment of differential weights to composite components 
during the measurement construction process might not accurately reflect true weights.  
He further argued that this will most likely not remain true when scores are highly related 
to one another if appropriate consideration was not devoted to this source of potential 
influence during measurement development (Govindarajulu, 1988).  Research also 
suggests that the use of incorrectly weighted indices introduces bias into the measurement 
of a given criterion (Perloff & Persons, 1988). Perloff and Persons (1988) further 
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supported this claim, reporting a notable 33% increase in the estimated explanatory 
power of a measure when comparing results derived from unjustified equally-weighted 
indices to results derived from differentially-weighted indices that were empirically and 
statistically justified.  Results from the study conducted by Perloff and Persons (1988) 
exemplified how the use of incorrectly weighted indices can leave a test vulnerable to 
error by introducing bias into criterion measurement, as evidenced by differences in the 
magnitude of the effect associated with the predictive utility between weighting 
conditions. 
Baldwin (2015) raised concern regarding the use of a priori or subjective weights, 
as explanation is rarely provided regarding the grounds on which these decisions are 
made.  Burt (1950) explained that this weighting procedure involves the alignment of the 
differential contribution of subjective weights and the experts’ beliefs regarding the 
relative importance of each of the subscales.  Baldwin (2015) argued that experts fail to 
address important empirical and statistical considerations regarding the variances of the 
subscales, covariance among the subscales, and the reliability of each of the subscales 
when assigning weights to subscales.  Fluctuating beliefs regarding subscale construct 
validity, as well perceived differences regarding subscale length and item difficulty is 
often reflected in corresponding beliefs regarding the relative importance of subscales.  
Therefore, the subscale weights more appropriately reflect the experts’ beliefs about 
those aforementioned factors, as opposed to the importance of the sub-constructs with 
respect to the actual measurement of the intended outcome (Baldwin, 2015).  In sum, 
Baldwin (2015) pushed for an improvement in the reporting of measurement 
development procedures by test authors. 
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The conversation of measurement principles in the field of neuropsychology, 
however, remains somewhat limited.  For example, a predominant topic of conversation 
in the field pertains to the sensitivity-specificity trade-off, such that neuropsychologists 
have direct substantive efforts towards improving clinical test utility.  Sensitivity is best 
defined as, “the proportion of people with the condition of interest correctly identified by 
a test as having the condition” (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012).  Specificity, 
on the other hand, is described as, “the proportion of people without the condition of 
interest correctly identified by a test as not having the condition” (Lezak et al., 2012).  
There is a trade-off between sensitivity and specificity, such that no test can have a 
perfect degree of both.  Ultimately, a test that is more sensitive lends itself to an increased 
number of “false alarms,” or false positive cases.  In contrast, a test with greater 
specificity than sensitivity lends itself to fewer false positive cases, but also a decreased 
number of true positives identified.  When considering the sensitivity-specificity trade-
off, test developers and researchers alike must determine which is more important given 
the purposes of a test. 
Sensitivity is often highly valued for the purposes of cognitive screening tests, as 
the benefits of allowing for more accurate detection of true positive cases, as evidenced 
by increased sensitivity, outweigh the risks associated with a false positive score.  
Subsequent decreases in specificity would then result in an increased number of Type II 
errors, potentially resulting in increased financial expenses, as patients who fall below cut 
scores on cognitive screening tests are then referred for a comprehensive 
neuropsychological evaluation.  However, even if the results of the comprehensive test 
indicate normal levels of cognitive functioning, the costly testing session will then serve 
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as a normative baseline for future comparative purposes, should concerns of deficit arise 
at a later point.  Therefore, many researchers dedicate time and effort towards researching 
ways to increase the sensitivity of cognitive screening measures for dementia, as 
decreasing Type II error by increasing measurement sensitivity is more highly valued 
than the decreasing of Type I error that would be associated with increased measurement 
specificity.  
The current study attempted to address these issues by evaluating the relative 
utility of the subscales of a brief cognitive screening instrument for dementia.  The 
primary goal of this study was to determine if the rank ordering of statistically generated 
subscale weights align with the rank ordering of the initial subscale weights applied 
during the original measurement construction process.  A secondary goal of the current 
study was to examine whether utilization of a statistically supported subscale-weighting 
algorithm could improve the sensitivity of a brief cognitive screening measure used to 
identify abnormal levels of cognitive impairment consistent with a diagnosis of dementia 
in older adults, the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 2, above and beyond the sensitivity rate 
obtained utilizing the original scoring method. 
II. Review of the Literature 
2.1 Cognitive Aging 
2.1.1 Age-related cognitive decline (ARCD). Understanding cognitive 
functioning during the human lifespan, especially in early development or old age, can 
provide unique insight into a person’s physical and psychological well-being.  The 
development of neuropsychological tests designed to measure overall cognition or 
individual aspects of cognition (e.g., memory, visuospatial abilities, learning, processing 
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speed, attention) has afforded clinicians the ability to quantitatively measure patient 
cognitive performance.  In the context of older adults diagnosed with neurodegenerative 
dementia, initial fluctuations in some previously stable area of cognitive functioning, as 
evidenced by below average neuropsychological testing scores, often serve as the 
principal indicator of the proliferation of neuronal cell death associated with the disease 
(Palmer, Backman, Winblad, & Fratiglioni, 2003).  However, this may not always be the 
case, as clinical neuropsychologists are faced with the challenge of distinguishing 
changes in cognitive abilities that result from typical age-related processes from changes 
resulting from an atypical pathological process, such as a neurodegenerative dementia. 
Increasing age correlates strongly with an increasing susceptibility to changes in 
cognition.  Older adults will inevitably experience a normal degree of slowing in the 
speed of mental processing, often resulting in diminished performance across various 
domains of cognition, including memory, attention, language, and executive functioning 
abilities (Smith & Bondi, 2008).  Several theories of aging have been proposed in 
attempts to explain the reasoning for the slowing of mental processes associated with 
normal aging.  Generally, most modern aging theories fall within one of two overarching 
theoretical categories: programmed or damaged theories. 
Programmed theories of aging propose that aging, similar to earlier stages of 
development, is an unavoidable process that is pre-determined by a biological clock 
(Goldsmith, 2012; Jin, 2010).  Essentially, these theories propose that age-related 
processes are simply an inevitable part of lifespan development.  Programmed theorists 
have also attributed an increased susceptibility to illness in older adults to an immune 
system that is programmed to decline with increasing age (Kowald & Kirkwood, 2016).  
  
12 
Ultimately, these researchers have attributed this this immune system vulnerability to the 
declines in health and cognition in older adulthood.  Another programmed theory of 
aging attributes cognitive decline in later life to programmatically timed genes that “turn 
on” in older adulthood, specifically. 
Damaged theories of aging have gained vast popularity since programmed 
theories have generally been discredited (Blagosklonny, 2013; Maynard, Fang, Scheibye-
Knudsen, Croteau, & Bohr, 2015).  Generally, these theories attribute age-related 
declines to a biological catalyst or dysfunction, which ultimately results in damage to the 
brain, rendering it unable to continue to operate optimally and efficiently (Kirkwood & 
Melov, 2011). 
Despite theoretical discrepancies, there is general agreement among researchers 
that age-related cognitive changes, to a degree, are associated with normal, non-
pathological processes and are believed to be benign in nature.  The presentation of 
cognitive decline due to pathological neural processes is often, in the early stages, very 
similar to age-related cognitive decline.  The etiological underpinnings of this atypical 
decline, however, remain unclear. 
2.1.2 Mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Petersen and colleagues adopted the 
term mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to describe declines in cognitive functioning that 
extend beyond the changes associated with age-related cognitive decline (ARCD), or 
cognitive decline associated with normal aging, but do not quite warrant a diagnosis of 
dementia (Petersen, Smith, Ivnik, Tangalos, Shaid, Thibodeau... & Kurland, 1995).  The 
original MCI diagnostic criteria included the presence of a subjective memory complaint, 
below average performance on memory tasks, preservation of general cognitive 
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functioning, maintenance of normal activities of daily living (ADLs), and the 
preservation of global cognition (Petersen, Smith, Waring, Ivnik, Tangalos, & Kokmen, 
1999).  Petersen, Caracciolo, Brayne, Gauthier, Jelic, and Fratiglioni (2014) proposed 
more recent diagnostic guidelines for MCI, which provide additional specification of the 
criteria in order to allow for improved clarification of the distinction between a diagnosis 
of MCI and dementia.  Similar to the original diagnostic criteria for MCI, current criteria 
includes the presence of a subjective complaint of cognitive impairment and maintenance 
of independence of ADLs (Petersen et al., 2014).  This newly adopted criteria, however, 
includes the objective determination of impairment in one or more domains of cognition 
(Petersen et al., 2014).  Additionally, the current criteria assert that the changes in 
cognition are not significant enough to hinder functioning in social or occupational 
contexts, precluding a diagnosis of dementia (Petersen et al., 2014). 
2.1.3 Dementia. Dementia is not a specific disease, but rather an umbrella term 
that refers to symptoms resulting from different types of brain disorders (World Health 
Organization, 1992).  The term “dementia” broadly categorizes many different diseases, 
all of which are characterized by a marked decline in baseline cognitive functioning that 
impedes a person’s ability to complete ADLs (Schoenberg & Duff, 2011).  The primary 
distinction between MCI and dementia is the independent completion of ADLs.  Both a 
person with MCI and a person with dementia will exhibit impairments in cognitive 
abilities on tests of cognition when compared to age and education-based normative data.  
A person with dementia, however, will require assistance with the completion of one or 
more ADLs, whereas a person with MCI will maintain the ability to complete ADLs 
independently.  Longitudinal studies have reported annual conversion rates from MCI to 
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dementia, ranging from approximately 2-31% (Mitchell & Shiri-Feshki, 2009; Bruscoli & 
Lovestone, 2004; Fischer, Jungwirth, Zehetmayer, Weissgram, Hoenigschnabl, Gelpi … 
& Tragel, 2007).  The conversion rate increases significantly when participants are 
monitored for a period of time that extends beyond one year.  When monitored over a 
two-to-three year period, conversion rates significantly increased, ranging from 
approximately 26-84% (Aerts, Heffernan, Kochan, Crawford, Draper, Tollor, Sachdev, & 
Brodatv, 2017; Fischer et al., 2007; Petersen et al., 1995; Petersen, Stevens, Ganguli, 
Tangalos, Cummings, & DeKosky, 2001; Tabuas-Pereira, M., Baldeiras, I., Duro, D., 
Santiago, B., Ribeiro, M.H., Leitao, M.J., Oliveira, C., & Santana, I., 2016).  Despite this 
variability across studies, there is a general consensus among researchers that MCI is 
considered a risk factor for dementia (Risacher, Saykin, West, Shen, Firpi, McDonald, & 
the ADNI, 2009).  Regardless of etiology or the course of progression of the disease, the 
fundamental feature of all dementias is diminished cognitive ability (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  This primary deficit has remained the focal point for 
dementia diagnoses across all iterations of diagnostic guidelines that have cycled through 
the research and clinical fields. 
Philippe Pinel, known as the father of modern psychiatry, is commonly credited 
with being one of the first to introduce the term démence, meaning dementia, to the 
scientific community through his detailed descriptions of the disease in 1797 (Boller & 
Forbes, 1998).  Nearly two centuries later, the term appeared for the first time in the third 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), where it 
was defined as, “a loss of intellectual abilities of sufficient severity to interfere with 
social or occupational functioning” (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  In a more 
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recent shift, the DSM-5 introduced the term major neurocognitive disorder (major-NCD), 
under which the term dementia is subsumed (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Major-NCD is characterized by a subjectively reported and objectively evidenced decline 
in at least one cognitive domain, resulting in interference in a person’s ability to function 
independently (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  To warrant a diagnosis of 
major-NCD, the cognitive decline must have resulted from something other than a 
delirium or another mental disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The 
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria also include behavioral, severity, and etiological specifiers for 
major-NCD. The clinician will specify whether a patient’s cognitive decline is or is not 
accompanied by behavioral disturbance.  Secondly, the clinician will specify the current 
severity of the patient’s cognitive decline as mild, moderate, or severe.  Major-NCD of 
mild severity is characterized by difficulties with instrumental ADLs (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).  These activities refer to more complex activities that 
require higher levels of processing, such as financial management.  Major-NCD of 
moderate severity is characterized by difficulties with basic ADLs (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). These activities refer to the more simplistic everyday tasks necessary 
for fundamental functioning, such as going to the bathroom or bathing.  Persons 
experiencing difficulties only completing instrumental ADLs require much less 
assistance from others in comparison to persons experiencing difficulties completing 
basic ADLs.  Specifically, the loss of independence in the completion of basic ADLs 
therefore implies the loss of independence in the completion of instrumental ADLs.  For 
example, a person requiring assistance with routine hygienic care due to cognitive 
impairment would correspondingly require assistance with financial management.  
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However, both persons with mild and moderately severe major-NCD maintain some 
degree of independence.  In contrast, persons with severe-stage major-NCD are fully 
reliant on others for all ADLs.  Lastly, clinicians will specify whether the dementia is due 
to any of the following causes: Alzheimer’s disease, Frontotemporal lobar degeneration, 
Lewy body disease, vascular disease, traumatic brain injury, substance/medication use, 
HIV infection, Prion disease, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s disease, another medical 
condition, multiple etiologies, or an unspecified etiology (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). 
The Clinical Manual for the 10th edition of the International Classification of 
Disorders (ICD-10) also includes a definition and description of dementia diagnostic 
criteria, referred to as “unspecified dementia” in diagnostic code F03.  The ICD-10 
describes dementia as, “a condition in which a person loses the ability to think, 
remember, learn, make decisions, and solve problems” and as, “an acquired organic 
mental disorder with the loss of intellectual abilities of sufficient severity to interfere with 
social or occupational functioning” (World Health Organization, 1992).  For health 
insurance purposes, clinicians’ reference specific codes listed for clinical conditions 
described in diagnostic manuals when providing a formally written account of a patient 
diagnosis.   Therefore, the diagnostic criteria within these manuals are predominantly 
utilized within the health insurance system, as these codes allow for insurances to 
efficiently deem patients eligible or ineligible for certain coverage and reimbursement.  
However, physicians typically do not reference these manuals directly to make formal 
clinical diagnoses. Instead, clinical neuropsychologists typically refer to empirically 
supported literature and published recommendations for updated guidelines created by 
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carefully constructed task forces comprised of some of the most well versed researchers 
and clinicians on the related topic in the scientific community.  The codes presented in 
the diagnostic manuals are primarily referenced for billing and insurance purposes. 
In 1984, the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and 
Stroke and the Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS-
ADRDA) work group described dementia syndrome as “the decline of memory and other 
cognitive functions in comparison with the patient’s previous level of function as 
determined by a history of decline in performance and by abnormalities noted from 
clinical examination and neuropsychological tests” (McKhann, Drachman, Folstein, 
Katzman, Price, & Stadlan, 1984).  These criteria specify that behavior serves as the basis 
for a diagnosis of dementia and that a diagnosis cannot be made in the presence of 
another medical condition that impacts cognition, as it would invalidate cognitive test 
results vital to the diagnostic procedure due to the inability to determine the true origin or 
cause of cognitive deficit. 
More recently, workgroups from the National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer’s 
Association (NIA-AA) proposed a set of core clinical criteria for “all-cause dementia” 
that currently reflects the most widely accepted and referenced guidelines for dementia 
diagnosis (McKhann, Knopman, Chertkow, Hyman, Jack, … Phelps, 2011).  These 
criteria indicate that a diagnosis of dementia is warranted in the presence of 
“neuropsychiatric symptoms that interfere with the ability to function at work or at usual 
activities, represent a decline from previous levels of functioning and performing, and are 
not explained by delirium or major psychiatric disorder” (McKhann et al., 2011).  
McKhann et al. (2011) also specify that the detection and diagnosis of cognitive deficit 
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must occur via a clinical interview involving the patient and a competent informant in 
order to thoroughly review patient history information, as well an objective assessment of 
cognitive ability obtained from the administration of brief cognitive testing or a 
neuropsychological evaluation.  Furthermore, the neuropsychiatric sequela must involve 
two or more of the following: “impaired ability to acquire and remember new 
information; impaired reasoning and handling of complex tasks, poor judgment; impaired 
visuospatial abilities; impaired language functions (speaking, reading, writing); or 
changes in personality, behavior, or comportment” (McKhann et al., 2011). 
2.1.4 Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form of 
dementia, was initially identified in 1906 when Dr. Alois Alzheimer identified distinct 
post-mortem brain abnormalities of a woman who had died due to what was then 
considered an unexplainably rare mental illness.  This woman, known as Auguste D, was 
described to have experienced atypical behavioral disturbances and significant declines in 
cognitive functioning, specifically with respect to her memory and language abilities.  It 
was through this post-mortem study that Dr. Alzheimer would receive credit for the 
identification of a disease that researchers have since coined, Alzheimer’s disease (AD).  
The presence of two distinct brain abnormalities, neurofibrillary tangles and beta amyloid 
plaques, identified by Dr. Alzheimer remain the hallmark of the neurodegenerative 
disease. 
Several diagnostic criteria for AD have circulated, and continue to circulate, 
throughout the scientific community.  McKhann et al. (1984) also proposed diagnostic 
criteria for AD in addition to the previously described proposed dementia diagnostic 
criteria.  An updated version of these criteria outlines the current, most widely referenced 
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guidelines for AD diagnosis, proposing three distinct classifications of AD diagnosis: 
probable AD dementia, possible AD dementia, and probable AD dementia with evidence 
of the AD pathophysiological process  (Mckhann et al., 2011).   Distinctions are made 
between the three terms based on the information obtained by the clinician during the 
diagnostic workup.  All three terms classifying an AD diagnosis rely on the preceding 
determination that the patient meets criteria for all-cause dementia. 
McKhann et al. (2011) indicated that a diagnosis of probable AD dementia is 
warranted when there is an insidious onset of cognitive deficit, a history of progressive 
cognitive decline clearly determined by means of subjective and informant reports or 
observations, and a either an amnestic or non-amnestic presentation of the initial and 
most prominent deficits as determined by history or objective assessment.  Most 
commonly, AD presents as amnestic, in which initial and most prominent cognitive 
deficits are in learning and memory recall (McKhann et al, 2011).  Cases in which deficit 
is initially and predominantly noted in language functioning (e.g., word-finding 
difficulties), visuospatial abilities (e.g., difficulties with spatial cognition, facial 
recognition), or executive functioning (e.g., reasoning, problem-solving) define the less 
common, non-amnestic presentation of AD (McKhann et al., 2011).  AD is a differential 
diagnosis, in which all other possible causes of cognitive decline must first be ruled out in 
order for a diagnosis of AD to be made. 
In contrast to a diagnosis of probable AD dementia, a diagnosis of possible AD 
dementia is appropriate when the course of patient deficits presents atypically if the 
patient either does not evidence an insidious onset of cognitive decline, or the clinician 
lacks a detailed patient history and is therefore unable to identify a clear pattern of 
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progressive decline (McKhann et al., 2011).  Possible AD dementia may also be 
diagnosed in cases in which the patient has a history of cerebrovascular disease, evidence 
of Dementia with Lewy Bodies, or evidence that the decline in cognitive functioning may 
have resulted from an alternative factor (McKhann et al., 2011).  McKhann et al. (2011) 
classify these cases as representing an “etiologically mixed presentation” of deficit, in 
which the clinician is unable to parse apart whether or not the sole cause of cognitive 
deficit can be solely attributed to AD pathology. 
McKhann et al. (2011) presented a third term, probable AD dementia with 
evidence of the AD pathophysiological process, for the classification of AD diagnosis.  
Evidence for this process may be obtained through the measurement of identified 
biomarkers specific to AD, which are pathogenic biological components contained in in 
the blood, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), or other tissue (Loring, 2015). Biomarkers specific 
to AD include the presence of amyloid-beta protein and downstream neuronal 
degeneration (McKhann et al., 2011).  The amino acid peptide, amyloid-beta is produced 
by the amyloid precursor protein (APP) and is found within the amyloid plaques that 
characterize AD (Loring, 2015).  Abnormal depositions of amyloid-beta can be identified 
via CSF analysis or amyloid positron emission tomography (PET) (Loring, 2015; 
McKhann et al., 2011).  This neuroimaging technique is used to identify the presence of 
amyloid-beta neuritic plaques in the brain (Loring, 2015).   AD is one of more than 20 
clinicopathological entities, collectively referred to as tauopathies (Williams, 2006).  
Therefore, abnormal elevations of phosphorylated tau (p-tau), total tau, and CSF tau also 
serve as biomarkers of AD (McKhann et al., 2011).  McKhann et al. (2011) presented this 
third term for to more specifically classify a diagnosis of possible and probable AD, as 
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the presence of AD biomarkers increases diagnostic certainty that the cognitive decline is 
truly attributable to the pathophysiological process seen in AD.  These pathogenic 
distinctions are believed to be responsible for the neurodegeneration and associated 
decline in cognitive functioning seen in AD. 
2.2 Neuropsychological Evaluations and the Diagnosis of Dementia 
The appearance of widespread cognitive deficits of increased severity, beyond 
those expected with normal aging, result from manifestations of pathological 
abnormalities that preclude optimal neurological functioning.  Diminished cognitive 
capacities of older adults result in notable changes in behavioral and functional abilities.  
Changes associated with age-related cognitive decline (ARCD) are generally subtle and 
non-debilitating in nature.  In contrast, changes associated with a neurodegenerative 
dementia, such as AD, are more severe and long lasting and result in decline that excels 
far beyond the expected changes in cognition associated with normal ARCD.  
Neuropsychologists are faced with the challenge of differentiating changes in cognition 
due to ARCD from changes in cognition that result from atypical neurodegenerative 
processes. 
A person experiencing symptoms of cognitive decline is most typically referred 
for a neuropsychological evaluation after family members or caregivers report changes in 
the person’s cognitive abilities.  Neuropsychologists administer these comprehensive 
evaluations in order to make inferences about brain-behavior relationships, make 
diagnoses, and describe relative strengths and weaknesses to aid treatment and 
rehabilitation. The neuropsychological evaluation is typically comprised of a clinical 
interview, a report of the patient’s history, and cognitive assessment (Lezak et al., 2012). 
  
22 
2.2.1 Clinical interview. A comprehensive review of qualitative patient data is a 
key component in the neuropsychological evaluation.  The clinical interview provides the 
neuropsychologist with a more comprehensive understanding of the patient’s cognitive 
and functional abilities.  The information from the clinical interview places the data 
obtained from cognitive testing into context, allowing the neuropsychologist to best draw 
conclusions regarding the brain-behavior relationships of a given patient.  The clinical 
interview involves the collection of information pertaining to the patient’s social, 
occupational, educational, medical, and psychiatric history, presenting problems, ADLs, 
and the current status of each component from both the patient and a secondary 
informant.  More often than not, individuals with dementia lack insight with respect to 
their presenting deficits.  In a study conducted by Shany-Ur, Lin, Rosen, Sollberger, 
Miller and Rankin (2014), degree of lack of awareness was highly positively correlated to 
neural atrophy in regions of the brain responsible for attention, self-related processing, 
and of self-knowledge.  Wilson, Boyle, Yu, Barnes, Sytsma, Buchman, Bennett, and 
Schneider (2015) reported that lack of awareness of memory impairment, specifically, 
appeared two to three years prior to the onset of the dementia, on average.  For this 
reason, someone closely related to or closely involved with the care of the individual with 
dementia, serves as a secondary informant during the clinical interview process.  A 
patient and the informant may be interviewed together or separately.  For example, a 
patient exhibiting signs of increased frustration or aggression may be interviewed 
separately from the informant in order to decrease levels of patient or informant distress.  
A primary goal of this component of the neuropsychological evaluation is to obtain 
information about the presenting symptoms.  Specifically, questions are often asked to 
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help identify when and how the symptoms began, as well as the ways in which the 
described symptoms may have changed over time. 
2.2.2 Record review and neuroimaging.  The clinician will review relevant 
patient records of medical, psychiatric, and social history in order to determine if the 
presenting symptoms could solely due to, or an exacerbation of, preexisting causes other 
than neurodegenerative processes that typify dementia.  This review is necessary as 
dementia is a differential diagnosis requiring all other possible differentials to first be 
ruled out in order to a clinical diagnosis of dementia to be concluded.  When available, 
the neuropsychologist will obtain and review the patient’s medical records.  Most often, 
these are obtained from the source through which the referral for the neuropsychological 
evaluation was made.  These records most typically provide information regarding 
current medications, medical workups, and medical history.  
In order to arrive at a clinical diagnosis, the clinician must first rule out all other 
possible causes for the dementia.  Specifically, it is important to first distinguish if the 
underlying cause of the dementia-related symptoms is the result of an alternate and 
potentially reversible etiology.  For example, depression, toxic encephalopathy, and even 
some rare diseases, can result in cognitive disarray that mimics dementia symptomology 
(Schoenberg & Scott, 2011; Singer, 2011).  Through a comprehensive review of the 
patient’s medical records, the clinician is able to extract relevant information to identify 
risk factors and evidence for alternative causes of the presenting symptoms.  Results from 
neuroimaging methods are also often gathered to provide additional information aiding 
differential diagnosis during the initial diagnostic workup. 
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Neuroimaging techniques provide valuable information for the differential 
diagnosis of dementia.  Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans are essential for 
determining the current structural nature of the brain.  A structural imaging method, MRI 
allows for the identification of volumetric changes of the brain that are consistent with 
the progression of neurodegenerative diseases (Tartaglia, Rosen, & Miller, 2011).  
Changes in degree of ventricular volume, global brain volume, and bilateral basal 
ganglion white matter have been linked to neurodegenerative progression represented by 
the conversion from MCI to AD (Li, Tan, Wang, Tan, Tan, Xu, Zhao, Wang… and Yu., 
2016).  It has been suggested that the amount of atrophy identified within Medial 
Temporal Lobes serves as the most reliable MRI indicator of conversion from MCI to 
dementia (Risacher et al., 2009).  As neurodegenerative processes associated with AD 
continue, atrophy expands beyond the Medial Temporal Lobes, ultimately resulting in 
global atrophy across all brain regions (Risacher et al., 2009).  The degree of global 
atrophy is most typically highly related to the severity of the stage of dementia, such that 
higher degrees of global atrophy are most commonly seen in the later stages of dementia.  
Neuroimaging alone, however, is not sufficient for a diagnosis of dementia. 
2.2.3 Cognitive assessment.  Neuropsychologists utilize information obtained 
from the clinical interview and patient history in tandem to aid the interpretation of 
cognitive assessment, which serves as an objective measurement of cognitive ability 
across domains of cognition.  A typical neuropsychological test battery for individuals 
with dementia involves the assessment of five cognitive domains: Attention and 
executive functioning, learning and memory, language and speech, visuoperception and 
visuoconstruction, and emotion, mood, and personality (Schoenberg & Scott, 2011).  The 
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neuropsychologist utilizes a combination of both nomothetic and ideographic approaches 
when interpreting test results, comparing the quantitative assessment data to age and 
education based norms, and previously obtained quantitative data indicative of individual 
baseline functional ability, if previously obtained.  These comparisons allow for the 
identification of deviations from “normal” levels of cognitive functioning.  Repeated 
administration of neuropsychological testing allows for the tracking of these patterns of 
cognitive ability over time, facilitating the identification and analysis of deviations from 
nomothetic and ideographic norms.  Researchers have examined these trends of cognitive 
deficits across clinical dementia populations, from which they have deduced “typical” 
cognitive profiles of different types of dementias.  Ultimately, clinicians rely on the 
identification of patterns of cognitive deficit when differentiating among different types 
of dementia (John, Gurnani, Bussell, Saurman, Griffen, & Gavett, 2016; Ritter, Leger, 
Miller, & Banks, 2017).  Only after exhausting all available resources to obtain 
information required to rule out all other possible causes of the patient’s decline in 
cognition, will a clinician provide a patient with a clinical diagnosis of dementia. 
Neuropsychologists will either administer either a fixed or flexible battery of 
cognitive tests.  A fixed battery involves the administration of a preselected grouping of 
cognitive tests.  For example, a neuropsychologist utilizing this approach would 
administer the same exact battery to all patients presenting with difficulties related to 
cognitive functioning regardless of individual differences, such as the severity of 
impairment, rate of decline, or the presentation of the deficits.  Essentially, these batteries 
adopt a “one size fits all” approach.  In contrast, a flexible battery adopts an 
individualized approach, which has gained vast popularity in current, Western 
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neuropsychological practice. As noted by Kubu, Ready, Festa, Roper, and Pliskin (2016), 
most North American neuropsychologists report a strong preference for the utilization of 
flexible batteries for the purposes of optimizing patient-centered accommodations, 
reducing the administration of redundant assessments, and emphasizing timeliness for 
both the patient and the clinician. 
The flexible battery approach to neuropsychological assessment rejects the “one 
size fits all” approach, and is instead comprised of a group of cognitive tests that have 
been hand-selected by the neuropsychologist.  The neuropsychologist determines which 
tests he or she will include within a flexible battery strictly based off of the needs of the 
individual.  For example, Patient A reported increasing word-finding difficulties over the 
past year during the clinical interview.  Additionally, the patient has a family history of 
AD.  Using a flexible battery approach, the neuropsychologist would likely create a 
battery that includes more measures assessing Patient A’s memory, as well as expressive 
and receptive language abilities.  On the other hand, Patient B reported increased 
difficulty when writing thank you cards during the holidays.  According to the review of 
patient history, this patient’s father was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease.  Based off of 
this information, the neuropsychologist would likely include more tests assessing Patient 
B’s visuoconstructional, spatial, and motor abilities within the flexible 
neuropsychological battery. 
2.3 Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 2 (DRS-2) 
The Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 2 (DRS-2) is a test of general cognitive ability 
that can be administered either within a comprehensive neuropsychological battery or on 
its own as a brief screening measure of cognition.  Stephen Mattis (1976) developed the 
  
27 
original version of the Dementia Rating Scale (DRS) to assess and track cognitive 
abilities in cognitively impaired populations, primarily those diagnosed with degenerative 
diseases.   A plethora of research published after the publication of the original version of 
the test highlighted the effects of age and education levels on DRS test scores, warranting 
the publication of an updated version of the test (Mattis, 1988).  Specifically, prior 
research has consistently demonstrated that older adults with lower levels of education 
perform more poorly on neuropsychological tests, which results in a misclassification of 
these individuals as having dementia when, in fact, the lower test scores are attributable 
to lower education status as opposed to a neurodegenerative disease (Marcopulos, 
McLain, & Giuliano, 1997; Mattis, 1988; Stern, Andrews, Pitman, Sano, Tatemichi, 
Lantigua, & Mayeux, 1992).  In addition, research regarding the influence of age on 
neuropsychological test scores has reliably revealed a negative relationship between age 
and neuropsychological test scores, which often leads to a misinterpretation that the 
lower test scores result from an underlying pathology, when that may not necessarily be 
the case (Marcopulos, et al., 1997; Nadler, Mittenberg, DePiano, & Schneider, 1994; 
Miller, Myers, Prinzi, & Mittenberg, 2009; Scheiber, Chen, Kaufman, & Weiss, 2017; 
Wisdom, Mignogna, & Collins, 2012).The second version of the DRS was introduced in 
2001 in order to provide a wider range of age and education based norms in comparison 
to the norms provided in the original version, which were obtained from a relatively 
small sample of younger adults (Mattis, 1976, 1988). 
The DRS-2 identically resembles the DRS, but also includes new standardized 
normative data, additional interpretive guidelines linking test scores with the test norms, 
and a review of research published since the publication of the original version of the 
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DRS highlighting the reliability and validity of the measure. The norms included in the 
second version were derived from the Mayo’s Older Americans Normative Studies 
(MOANS), a project designed to create age-based norms for adults ages 55 and older and 
to validate the clinical utility of a collection of cognitive tests (Ivnik, Malec, Tangalos, 
Petersen, Kokmen, & Kurland, 1990; Ivnik, Smith, Tangalos, Petersen, Kokmen, & 
Kurland, 1991; Ivnik, Malec, Smith, Tangalos, Petersen, Kokmen, & Kurland, 1992; 
Lucas, Ivnik, Smith, Bohac, Tangalos, Kokmen, Graff-Radford, & Petersen, 1998; Lucas, 
Ivnik, Willis, Ferman, Smith, Parfitt, Petersen, & Graff-Radford, 2005).  The MOANS 
data were co-normed across measures to allow for the comparison of individual 
performance in various cognitive domains across different levels of age (Lucas et al., 
1998; Lucas et al., 2005).  The MOANS battery from which this expanded normative 
data were generated included the original DRS. The DRS-2 testing manual also includes 
the regression equation created by Lucas et al. (1998) adjusting for differences in 
education level.  The expanded norms introduced in the second version of the DRS were 
provided to more adequately account for the variability in patient performance across age 
and education and therefore improve clinical interpretations of obtained scores on the 
measure.  Identical to the original version of the DRS, the DRS-2 also consists of 36 
items that are intended to assess general cognitive ability across five subscales: Attention 
(ATT), Initiation/Perseveration (IP), Conceptualization (CONC), Memory (MEM), and 
Construction (CONST).  The number of possible points per subscales ranges from 6 to 39 
points. 
The items on the DRS-2 are not scored independently, as items within each 
subscale are arranged hierarchically in terms of item difficulty, with more difficult items 
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appearing first within each subsection of the test.  If a person answers the initial and 
therefore most difficult questions correctly within a subsection of the test, the person will 
skip and automatically receive points the remainder of the questions in that section.  
Lower subscale scores represent lower levels of domain-specific cognitive abilities and 
higher levels of domain-specific cognitive deficit.  Similarly, lower total DRS-2 scores 
represent lower levels of cognitive abilities, or a greater level of cognitive deficit.  
According to a study conducted by Montgomery and Costa (1983), DRS-2 total scores 
fell below 123/144 in 62% of patients with dementia, whereas only 12% of non-demented 
patients received a DRS-2 total score of 123/144.  Vangel and Lichtenberg (1995) 
reported an 87% correct classification rate with 85% sensitivity and 90% specificity 
utilizing a 125 cut score in a younger sample of older adults (ages 62-79), and reported 
similar rates utilizing a cut score of 123 in a sample of older adults ages 80-95.  The most 
widely referenced cut score for the DRS-2 currently remains a total score of 123/144. 
Research suggests that poor performance on the Memory and 
Initiation/Perseveration subscales correlates highly with increased levels of cognitive 
impairment associated with AD (Monsch, Bondi, & Salmon, 1995).  Additional research 
has identified a relationship between performance across different cognitive domains and 
ADLs.  Specifically, poor performance on measures of processing speed (Owsley, 
Sloane, McGwin, & Ball, 2002) and executive function (Marshall, Rentz, Frey, Locascio, 
Johnson, & Sperling, 2012; Martyr & Clare, 2012) have been linked to poor performance 
on tests of everyday competence.  Although processing speed is not directly assessed via 
the DRS-2, the initiation/perseveration subscale assesses various aspects of executive 
functioning, as the tasks within this subscale evaluate the ability to appropriately initiate, 
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alternate, and terminate behavior.  Furthermore, it has been posited that poor performance 
on tests of executive functioning may serve as a predictor of AD in normative samples 
(Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2004).  Not only do individuals with AD perform more 
poorly on these tests of everyday competence, but they also tend to take longer time to 
complete the test-related tasks and make an increased amount of errors when completing 
the tasks compared to individuals with MCI (Sacco, Joumier, Darmon, Dechamps, 
Derreumaux, Lee, Piano, Bordone… & Robert, 2012).  The results obtained from the 
study by Sacco et al. (2012) were derived using scores on the Mini Mental State 
Examination (MMSE).  Scores on the MMSE, another screening measure of cognitive 
impairment, highly correlate with scores on the DRS, suggesting the generalization of 
these performance effects to expected scores on the DRS-2 (Folstein, Folstein, & 
McHugh, 1975; Salmon, Thal, Butters, & Heindel, 1990; Bobholz & Brandt, 1993). 
The DRS-2 has been subject to numerous statistically driven studies that aimed to 
examine the internal structure of the test, or the degree to which the items on DRS-2 
actually measure the cognitive constructs that they intend to measure. Consequently, 
researchers have criticized the DRS-2 for its inconsistency across factor analytic studies.  
Colantonio, Becker, and Huff (1993) reported a three-factor structure for the DRS, 
defining the structures as conceptualization, construction, and memory.  Consistent 
findings supporting this three-factor structure have since been reported (Woodard, 
Salthouse, Godsall, & Green, 1996).  Woodard et al. (1996) reported an additional fourth 
factor that did not meet the researchers inclusion criteria for the identification of factor 
structures, labeling the non-statistically significant factor as 
attention/initiation/perseveration.  In contrast, additional research identified a two-factor 
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structure for the measure, in which items can be more appropriately defined solely as 
verbal and non-verbal components (Kessler, Roth, Kaplan, & Goode, 1994).  Kessler et 
al. (1994) also reported the presence of a high degree of overlap between the Memory 
and Conceptualization subscales, suggesting that these two subscales are virtually 
inseparable from one another.  Kessler et al. (1994) suggested that the inconsistencies 
across factor analytic studies might be attributable to the way in which the measure was 
initially constructed, suggesting that the subscales were created on a strictly conceptual 
basis.  Specifically, researchers have questioned if the subscales lack sufficient empirical 
support due to the lack of statistical consideration during the initial measurement 
development process (Kessler et al., 1994).  The inconsistency across factor analytic 
studies could suggest a potential flawed five-factor structure, as was initially determined 
during the construction of the measure.  However, this inconsistency may be better 
explained by the violation of the independence of scores assumption.  The test items fail 
to be independent from one another due to the arrangement and scoring of the items 
according to difficulty level, such that a score on one item influences scores on other 
items.  Therefore, exploratory factor analysis may not be an appropriate method for 
examining the dimensionality of the DRS and the results of these studies should be 
interpreted with caution. 
2.3.1 DRS-2 subscale weighting. The DRS contains a greater number of 
questions and total points than most general brief cognitive screening tests for dementia, 
making the test unique from most others.  Because of this, breakdown of the subscale 
scores lend more influential to numerical test outcome, especially when referencing the 
recommended cut score that implies a level of deficit associated with dementia.  As seen 
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in Table 2, there is an unequal distribution of the number of test items and points allotted 
to each subscale in relation to the composite.  Interestingly, the proportion of subscale 
test items to the total number of test items on the composite is more evenly distributed 
than the proportion of number of possible points per subscale to the number of total 
possible points on the composite.  Therefore, it is seen that some subscales were provided 
with greater statistical weights relative to other subscales in the measure (See Table 2).  
Although Mattis (1976, 1988) and Jurica, Letten, & Mattis (2001) provided a brief 
description of the item review process during the development of the measure, no 
additional information was provided in the testing manual describing the measurement 
development process.  Therefore, it remains unclear as to why certain subscales were 
weighted more heavily than others when the test was constructed.  Furthermore, 
considering that the DRS-2 was initially created for the purposes of administration to a 
sample of older adults diagnosed with AD, the current rank ordering of subscale weights 
appears somewhat a-theoretical.  For example, deficit in memory, specifically delayed 
recall, serves as the most reliable indicator of AD diagnosis (Karantzoulis, & Galvin, 
2011; McKhann et al., 2011; Schoenberg & Duff, 2011).  Therefore, one may wonder 
why the Memory subscale did not include the greatest number of questions, or receive the 
greatest weighting when applying numerical points to each test item.  Comparisons of 
hypothetical subscale performance on the DRS-2 are presented below to illustrate the 
potential influence of differential subscale weighting on test outcome. 
A comparison of hypothetical performance scores on the DRS-2 subscale 
containing the lowest-weighted score (Construction) and the highest-weighted score 
(Conceptualization) highlights the effects associated with differentially weighted subscale 
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scores.  For example, the DRS-2 Construction subscale was assigned the lowest weight 
relative to the other subscales, with a maximum possible subscale score of 6 points (See 
Table 1).  In contrast, the DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale was assigned the greatest 
weight, with a maximum possible subscale score of 39 points.  Interestingly, both the 
Construction and Conceptualization subscales each contain 6 items.  Upon examination 
of the relative proportions associated with the number of items per subscale to the total 
number of items on the entire test, these two subscales provide the same relative 
contribution to the test.  Specifically, the 6 Conceptualization items account for 16% of 
the total number of items on the DRS-2, and the 6 Construction items account for a 
separate 16% of the total number of items on the DRS-2.  However, this identical pattern 
in terms of relative contribution of each subscale to the total composite score is 
eliminated once scores are applied to each of the subscales.  These two subscales that 
initially maintained equivalent weights and contributed equally in terms of number of 
items per subscale to the number of items for the entire measure become drastically 
different.  Once subscale scores are applied to each of the five subscales, we see that the 
weight of the relative contribution of the Construction subscale to total score on the 
composite shifts downward in comparison to its relative contribution associated with the 
number of subscale items, with a maximum possible subscale score of 6 points.  In 
contrast, the weight of the relative contribution of the Construction subscale score to the 
total score on the composite shifts upward in comparison to its relative contribution 
associated with the number of subscale items, with a maximum possible subscale score of 
39 points.  Now, upon examination of the relative proportions associated with the number 
of points per subscale to the total number of points on the entire test (total possible 
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composite score = 144), these two subscales provide vastly differential relative 
contributions to the composite score on the measure.  With a weight of 39 possible 
subscale points, the 6 Conceptualization items account for 27% of the 144 total possible 
points on the overall measure.  In contrast, with a weight of 6 possible subscale points, 
the 6 Construction items account for 4% of the 144 total possible points on the 
composite. 
However, clinicians do not solely refer to the total scores on tests of cognition 
when making interpretations about patient cognitive performance.  Instead, clinicians turn 
towards more specific components of the test to determine where, or in which cognitive 
domains, the patient evidenced areas of deficits based on areas of poor performance.  
Testing data may be misleading, as performance may still be more accurately described 
as a function of the test.  For example, the first out of the 11 tasks on the 
Initiation/Perseveration subscale of the DRS-2 represents a complex test of category 
fluency, which has reliably been reported as a specific and sensitive test to detect 
cognitive deficit in persons with AD (Libon, McMillan, Powers, Massimo, Khan… & 
Grossman, 2009; Rascovsky & Grossman, 2007).  On this item, patients are directed to 
verbally generate a list of all of the possible examples of items within a specific category.  
The test technician records the patient’s responses over the span of one minute, as this is 
a time-limited task.  Possible scores on this task range from 0-20, with a score of zero 
representing no correct answers and a score of 20 representing full credit in which all 
generated responses were scored correctly.  Interestingly, in a study conducted by 
Tombaugh, Kozak, and Rees (1999), cognitive healthy older adults ages 60-69 years 
generated 17.6 words on a similar test of category fluency, on average.  It is expected that 
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cognitively healthy older adults would earn a perfect score on the DRS-2, as the test was 
initially created with an intended low floor effect to allow for the assessment of 
individuals in the severe stage of dementia (Mattis, 1976).  However, the research 
conducted by Tombaugh et al. (1999) suggests that even cognitively healthy older adults 
would not, on average, earn a perfect score on this particular task.  This highlights a point 
of contention in the development of the measure, as the DRS-2 testing manual does not 
explain why 20 total possible points were assigned to this task, nor does it provide 
reasoning for why the generation of 20 items on this list is considered representative of 
“normal” functioning.  Based on the current distribution of points across tasks from this 
subscale, it appears as though a loss of points on this one task may result in a 
misrepresentation of cognitive deficit. 
For example, if a 65 year-old patient received a score of 17/20 on this one task, a 
score approximately representative of the average performance of a cognitively healthy 
older adult of this age, but received full credit on all subsequent subscale tasks, the 
patient would earn a total subscale score of 34/37.  In comparison to the performance of 
individuals of the same age, the MOANS scaled scores indicate that a subscale score of 
34/37 falls in the 11-18th percentile range.   Instead, it may make more sense for the task 
to be assigned a value of 17 total possible points, as opposed to 20, to more accurately 
reflect evidence of cognitive deficit when scores fall below the average score of age-
matched cognitively healthy comparisons.  It remains unclear as to why this task is 
scored out of a total of twenty possible points, as this could presumably result in a loss of 
points from healthy older adults without dementia.  Therefore, this particular task renders 
the AD patient increasingly susceptible to earning what may be considered unjustifiably 
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low scores on this task.  This highlights the need for additional consideration to be given 
to test development efforts when determining the relevant importance of tasks and 
subscales within a measure of cognition.  
III. Current Study 
Statistical and empirical support should be considered in tandem during 
measurement construction in order to further improve upon the reliability and validity of 
cognitive tests.  Even though test developers provide strong support for some forms of 
reliability and validity evidence (e.g., interrater reliability, internal consistency, test-retest 
reliability, validation of test questions by several content experts), it appears that 
scholarship has devoted less attention to statistical components vital to the measurement 
construction process.  The DRS-2 testing manual, for example, does not provide 
statistical explanation regarding the distribution of points to each subscale.  Conceptually, 
the amount of points assigned to each subscale do not appear to align with the empirical 
research regarding the diagnosis of either all-cause dementia or AD dementia, 
specifically.  Specifically, research has reliably identified performance on delayed recall 
tasks as the best indicator of the presence of AD, as neuropathological effects in AD are 
first identified in the medial temporal lobes, the area of the brain responsible for memory 
consolidation (Karantzoulis & Galvin, 2011; McKhann et al., 2011; Schoenberg & Duff, 
2011).  Therefore, the existing literature suggests that the memory subscale maintains the 
greatest importance in the prediction of cognitive deficit associated with AD.  However, 
that is not reflected in the assignment of points to each of the DRS-2 subscales (See Table 
1).  Although the DRS-2 is administered to track cognitive decline in individuals with 
various types of dementia, the original DRS testing manual stated that the measure was 
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initially developed to assess the cognitive functioning of dementia patients diagnosed 
with Alzheimer’s disease.  Therefore, considering this information in conjunction with 
the characteristics of the original sample from which the test was first normed, it appears 
that the Memory subscale warrants the greatest importance relative to the other subscales.  
This is not the case, however, as the Memory subscale maintains the lowest relative 
contribution to the total number of questions and the total number of possible points on 
the entire measure out of all five subscales with respect to the number of items it contains 
(5 items, 13% of total test items included in the entire measure).  With no explanation 
provided in the testing manual to support the specific ways in which this measure and its 
subscales were constructed, it appears that arbitrary weighting procedures may have been 
inadvertently applied during the development of the DRS-2.  This uncertainty warrants 
further examination into the relative importance of each of the DRS-2 subscales to 
determine sources of statistical support for the relative importance implied by the 
corresponding points assigned. 
Taken together, literature suggests a differential effect of the weighting of 
subscale scores on measurement reliability and validity.  Specifically, research suggests 
that the accuracy of cut scores may highly relate to the internal structure of a measure 
(Baldwin, 2015; Burt, 1950; Govindarajulu, 1988; Meehl & Rose, 1955; Perloff & 
Persons, 1988; Thompson, 1940; Wang & Stanley, 1970).  Although cut scores are not 
utilized solely for clinical decision-making, the proposed cut scores associated with the 
DRS-2 may vary across the clinical population in which the test is administered, due to 
the fact that the empirically supported differential trajectory of cognitive decline is not 
reflected appropriately for all clinical populations in the relative importance of the DRS-2 
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subscale scores.  Therefore, there is a need for the evaluation of statistical support for the 
weighting methods applied to both new and pre-existing neuropsychological measures in 
order to ensure that these measures are constructed optimally to best allow for the early 
detection of dementia.  Consideration should be given to cases in which support for 
alternative weighting methods are conceptually and statistically supported, as 
improvements to these measures may increase their ability to pick up subtle changes 
associated with dementia, therefore allowing for more increased correct classification 
rates of the disease when utilizing these screening measures. 
3.1 Research Questions 
1. What is the ordering of relative importance of the five DRS-2 subscales to 
predicting dementia diagnosis? 
2. What are the effects of utilizing a logit-weighting subscale algorithm on DRS-2 
sensitivity and specificity compared to the sensitivity and specificity of the 
original version of the test? 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Prior research suggests that that memory impairment appears first in the course of 
progressive cognitive decline associated with AD dementia, with impaired delayed recall 
serving as the strongest predictor of the presence of AD dementia (Schoenberg & Duff, 
2011).  The clinical manifestation of episodic memory impairment arises as the result of 
the degeneration of the medial temporal lobe structures, including the entorhinal cortex 
and the hippocampus (Karantzoulis & Galvin, 2011).  Impaired language abilities are also 
one of the associated impairments evidenced early on in the course of AD dementia 
(Karantzoulis & Galvin, 2011).  Specifically, patients with AD display marked 
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impairments in semantic fluency compared to healthy older adults of the same age (Lezak 
et al., 2012).  In addition, research suggests visuospatial deficits are also prominently 
noted early on in the typical course of AD (Possin, 2010; Rizzo, Anderson, Dawson, & 
Nawrot, 2000).  These deficits are often apparent on neuropsychological tests in which 
the patient is required to complete a figure-drawing task without error.  Although 
executive functions are, in most cases, spared in the earliest stages of AD, dysfunction in 
this cognitive domain typically surfaces during the moderate stage of AD and continues 
to worsen with progression into the severe stage (Baudic, Barba, Thibauder, Smagghe, 
Remy, & Traykov, 2006).  These deficits most commonly present on tests of cognitive 
ability as difficulties in abstract reasoning, with signs of decreased ability to complete 
tasks, follow directions, and transition from one task to another arising more prominently 
in the moderate stage of AD (Crowell, Luis, Vanderploeg, Schinka, & Mullan, 2002; 
Collette, Amieva, & Adams, 2007).  Research suggests that attention remains relatively 
preserved in patients with AD, and if often one of the last cognitive processes affected by 
the disease (Calderon, Perry, Erzinclioglu, Berrios, Dening, & Hodges, 2001).  Taken 
together, I hypothesized that the logistic regression analysis utilized to investigate my 
first research question would reveal the following rank ordering, from greatest to least 
importance, of the five DRS-2 subscales: Memory, Initiation/Perseveration, 
Conceptualization, Construction, Attention.  With respect to my second research 
question, I hypothesized that the new scoring algorithm generated from the standardized 
logistic regression logit weights would increase the sensitivity, and either decrease or 
maintain the same level of specificity of the DRS-2 compared to the sensitivity and 
specificity rates utilizing the original version of the test in this sample. 
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IV. Methodology 
This study utilized archival data from the Adult Neurology Clinic at the 
University of Virginia Health System located in Charlottesville, Virginia to obtain the 
total sample, which included 113 older adults ages 65 and older (55 AD, 58 MCI).  These 
patient groups were selected for use in the current analyses because these were the groups 
in which DRS-2 data were available within the archival database in which data were 
obtained.  Table 3 presents a summary of demographic information for both participant 
groups. 
A Data Use Agreement was drafted between James Madison University and the 
University of Virginia to allow for the use of this limited archival dataset.  No identifying 
information was contained in the archival database.  The following variables were 
included in the database: randomly generated and non-linked case ID, group, age, sex, 
race, education level, and DRS raw subscale and total scores.  No missing data were 
identified within the dataset.  The UVA Institutional Review Board approved the creation 
of a patient database for research purposes prior to the initiation of data collection.  Data 
in this dataset were obtained during the participants’ initial comprehensive flexible 
neuropsychological battery administration that took place during the clinical diagnostic 
workup process.  A trained psychometrician or clinical neuropsychology post-doctoral 
fellow administered the DRS-2 in the English language.  Rater agreement information 
was not recorded within the archival database, and therefore interrater reliability was 
unable to be calculated.  The neuropsychological evaluations administered utilized a 
flexible battery approach to obtain the quantitative data for the cognitive assessment 
portion of the evaluation.  All participants in this group were clinically diagnosed with 
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either AD dementia or MCI suspected to be due to AD by a licensed clinical 
neuropsychologist.  Diagnoses of suspected AD etiology were made based on all 
available information at the time of testing, which often included a neurology workup, 
labs, and imaging, in addition to the results from the comprehensive neuropsychological 
evaluation.  Diagnoses were made in accordance with the diagnostic criteria presented in 
the McKhann et al. (2011) and Petersen et al. (2014) diagnostic criteria guidelines for AD 
and MCI, respectively.  All analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 
25 (IBM Corp., 2017). 
The new scoring algorithm for the DRS-2 was constructed utilizing the 
standardized beta weights generated using hierarchical single predictor entry logistic 
regression.  Variables were entered independently into the logistic regression equation in 
order of predictor importance as suggested by the results of empirical studies outlined in 
the literature review. 
V. Results 
5.1 Preliminary Analyses 
Prior to analyses, all data were examined via visual inspection and frequency and 
descriptive analyses in SPSS for accuracy of data entry, missing values, outliers and fit 
between their distributions and the assumptions associated with logistic regression 
analysis.  Variables were examined separately for the 55 AD participants and the 58 MCI 
participants.  There were no missing data identified in the dataset. 
A preliminary series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to assess 
whether there were significant mean differences in demographic values between the AD 
and MCI participant groups.  On average, group ages differed by 2.190 years, which was 
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a statistically significant difference at an alpha level of .05, t(111) = 2.060, p = .042, CI: 
.083 to 4.296. AD and MCI participants differed by an average of .032 years of 
education, which was not statistically significant at an alpha level of .05, t(111) = .053, p 
= .958, CI: -1.162 to 1.226.  A summary of the means and standard deviations for age and 
education level associated with each of the two groups is presented in Table 2. 
Additional independent samples t-tests were conducted to identify mean 
differences between groups on each of the continuous variables included in the logistic 
regression analysis to foreshadow which variables would likely provide the greatest 
relative utility once entered into the logistic regression equation.  Of the five subscales, 
AD and MCI patients statistically significantly differed on Attention [t(111) = -3.173, p = 
.002, CI: -3.123 to -.722], Initiation/Perseveration [t(111) =  -5.396, p < .001, CI: -6.734 
to -3.117],  Conceptualization [t(111) = -3.647, p < .001, CI: -3.680 to -1.072], and 
Memory [t(111) = -9.991, p < .001, CI: -6.835 to -4.573].  Groups did not statistically 
significantly differ on Construction [t(111) = -1.844, p = .068, CI: -.510 to .018].  See 
Table 4 for a summary of DRS-2 subscale mean scores and standard deviations.  
Comparisons of average test scores across the five subscales foreshadowed that the four 
subscales in which the two groups differed (Attention, Initiation/Perseveration, 
Conceptualization, and Memory) would potentially provide the greater unique utility in 
discriminating between AD and MCI patients, relative to the Construction subscale. 
Comparisons of unique predictor utility were further tested in the logistic regression 
analysis via comparison of standardized predictor weights.  Results from this analysis are 
reported below. 
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5.1.1 Assumptions.  All assumptions associated with logistic regression were 
tested.  First, logistic regression assumes the correct specification of the model, such that 
all IVs specified in the hypothesis are included in the model (Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003).  Visual inspection of the scatterplots of the residuals for each IV included 
in the regression model did not reveal the presence of substantial systematic variation.  
Therefore, there did not appear to be any support for a violation of this first assumption 
(Cohen et al., 2003). 
Second, logistic regression assumes the independence of errors, such that cases 
included in the dataset are unrelated.  Errors are assumed to be independent in between-
subjects research designs.  Therefore, given that the current study utilized a between-
subjects research design, analyses were conducted without concern of a violation of this 
assumption. 
Third, logistic regression assumes no measurement error in the IVs.  Violations of 
this assumption result in biased parameter estimates and standard errors, increased type 1 
error rate, and attenuated effect sizes associated with individual estimates (Cohen et al., 
2003).  Coefficient alpha was unable to be computed as a measure of internal reliability 
for this measure, as item-level information was not recoded in the archival database 
utilized for this study.  Similarly, interrater reliability was unable to be calculated, as no 
information regarding interrater agreement was collected and recorded in the database.  
However, the DRS-2 was administered to all patients and scored by a psychometrician or 
a clinical neuropsychology post-doctoral fellow, both of whom completed the same UVA 
neuropsychological testing administration training.  This suggests that appropriate actions 
were taken to ensure sufficient interrater reliability and therefore decreased the possibility 
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that rater disagreement posed a notable threat to reliability.  Error committed during the 
data entry process must also be considered when examining for violations of this 
assumption.  Specifically, data entry error can create problems that closely resemble 
issues associated with measurement error and subsequently be mistakenly interpreted as 
such.  All data included in the archival database were initially obtained via medical 
record review and through an additional review of paper copies of patient medical files.  
This process allowed for the examination of consistency between both sources of 
information, reducing the possibility for data entry error.  I proceeded with analyses 
recognizing my inability to calculate reliability estimates as a limitation of the study. 
5.1.2 Practical issues.  Multicollinearity among the IVS, outliers, and complete 
separation of the data between two participant groups may cause several issues when 
conducting logistic regression.  Specifically, high correlations among the IVs in the 
model result in inflated standard errors associated with the parameter estimates 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013).  Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to examine 
the bivariate relationships among the five predictors in the model and to assess for 
potential multicollinearity (see Table 5).  Higher education level was statistically 
significantly related to higher scores on Initiation/Perseveration (p < .05) and 
Conceptualization (p < .01).  Scores on Attention were positively related to scores on 
Initiation/Perseveration (p < .01) and scores on Conceptualization were positively related  
to scores on Memory (p < .01).  Initiation/Perseveration scores also positively correlated 
with Memory (p < .01) and Conceptualization (p < .05) scores.  None of the correlation 
coefficients were greater than or equal to a value of .70, suggesting that there was not a 
high degree of overlap among the predictors (Cohen, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
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2013).  Therefore, I proceeded with the logistic regression analysis without any major 
concern regarding issues of multicollinearity; however, the overlap among the predictors 
was considered when interpreting results of the logistic regression analyses. 
The presence of outliers in logistic regression can result in biased parameter 
estimates and corresponding standard errors.  Outliers were examined separately for AD 
participants and MCI participants.  No outliers in the dataset were identified via visual 
inspection of the residual scatterplots, box plots, or histograms for each of the five 
predictors. 
The presence of sparseness among the data can result in a continuous inflation of 
the parameter estimates and corresponding standard errors (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013).  It 
can also cause convergence failure of the model.  Sparseness was examined by 
comparing data from patients diagnosed with AD to data from patients diagnosed with 
MCI for each of the five DRS-2 subscales.  No groupings of empty cells or low cell 
counts were identified among the data, suggesting data were not sparse. 
5.2 Primary Analyses 
Logistic regression was conducted to investigate the relative contribution of the 
set of DRS-2 subscale scores to predict cognitive deficit associated with a diagnosis of 
dementia.  A logistic regression model including the five subscales as predictors was 
fitted to the data to test the hypothesis that the five tests included in the model would 
differentially contribute to patient diagnosis. 
 
Logistic regression results showed that, 
Predicted logit of DIAGNOSIS = -28.192 + (.171)*ATT + (.186)*I/P + 
(.157)*CONCEP + (.495)*MEM + (.408)*CONST.             (1) 
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The model containing all five DRS-2 subscales (-2LL = 72.456) statistically 
significantly improved the prediction of group membership (AD, MCI) compared to a 
model containing no predictors (DNull = 156.57) , χ2 (5, N = 113) = 84.12, p <.001.  The 
amount of null deviance left unexplained by the five-predictor model was not statistically 
significantly different from the amount of deviance that would be left over due to chance 
[-2LL (72.456) < χ2crit (113.145)].  Therefore, I concluded that the model containing all 
five DRS-2 subscales adequately predicted group membership. 
Approximately 51.5% of the null deviance is accounted for by Attention, 
Initiation/Perseveration, Conceptualization, Memory, and Construction DRS-2 test scores 
(R2L = .515).  Two additional R
2 analog indices indicate that the five-predictor model 
accounts for 52.5% (Cox and Snell R2 = .525) and 70% (Nagelkerke R2 = .700) of the 
null deviance in the criterion. 
Memory was a significant predictor of AD diagnosis, controlling for all other 
predictors in the model [Wald χ2 (1, N=113)  = 24.383, p < .001].  Specifically, for every 
unit increase in Memory, the odds of AD diagnosis increased by a factor of 1.641 [CI: 
1.348 to 1.998].  Initiation/Perseveration was also a significant predictor of AD diagnosis, 
controlling for all other predictors in the model [Wald χ2 (1, N=113) = 6.086, p = .014].  
For every unit increase in Initiation/Perseveration, the odds of AD diagnosis increased by 
a factor of 1.204 [CI: 1.039 to 1.396].  See Table 6 for a summary of the predicted log 
odds and odds ratios associated with each of the five predictors included in the logistic 
regression model. 
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Comparisons were made between actual group membership and predicted group 
membership using the five-predictor model.  Overall, 85.8% of the participants were 
correctly classified with a diagnosis of dementia using the model containing all five 
predictors.  Specifically, 48 out of 55 participants that were actually diagnosed with 
dementia due to AD were correctly classified as belong to the AD dementia group 
(87.3%).  In contrast, 49 out of 58 participants that were actually diagnosed with MCI 
were correctly classified as belonging to the MCI group (85.8%). 
Memory [b = .495, CI: .299. to .692, OR = 1.641, CI: 1.348 to 1.998, Wald χ2 (1, 
N=113) = 24.383, p < .001, Likelihood Ratio χ2 (1, N=113) = 64.739, p < .001] and 
Initiation/Perseveration [b = .186, CI: .038 to .334, OR = 1.204, CI: 1.039 to 1.396, Wald 
χ2 (1, N=113) = 6.086, p = .014, Likelihood Ratio χ2 (1, N=113) = 8.578, p = .003] each 
statistically significantly accounted for the outcome, when controlling for all of the other 
predictors in the model.  The Wald tests were non-significant for the three other 
predictors in the model (p > .05). 
Each of the predictors in the model was converted to standardized z-scores and 
the standardized scores were entered into a second logistic regression equation to allow 
for comparisons regarding relative utility to be made across all five predictors.  The DRS-
2 Memory subscale had the greatest predictive utility to detecting cognitive deficit 
associated with dementia (β = 2.062, OR = 7.863) given all of the other predictors in the 
model.  Initiation/Perseveration provided the second greatest predictive utility given the 
other variables in the model (β  = 1.008, OR = 2.741).  Out of all five tests, 
Conceptualization provided the third highest predictive utility of clinical diagnosis (β  = 
.576, OR = 1.779).  Attention (β  = .573, OR = .1.774) and Construction (β  = .292, OR = 
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1.339) provided the fourth and fifth ranked predictive utility, given all of the other 
predictors in the model.  The standardized log odds for each of the five predictors were 
utilized to generate the new subscale weights for the new scoring algorithm of the DRS-2 
subscales. 
5.3 Secondary Analyses 
To answer my second research question, I examined the predictive validity of the 
DRS-2 cut score using the new logit-weighting algorithm.  Comparisons were then made 
between the original DRS-2 scores and the newly computed DRS-2 scores generated by 
the statistical weighting algorithm.  To do this, I utilized the recommended cut score of 
123/144 to identify cases representative of true positives, false positives, true negatives, 
and false negatives for the original DRS-2 raw total scores.  I calculated sensitivity and 
specificity for the original form of the test utilizing this data displayed in Figure 1.  In the 
current study, sensitivity represents the percentage of participants with dementia correctly 
identified by the DRS-2 as having dementia, whereas specificity represents the 
percentage of participants without dementia correctly identified as not having dementia 
(Lezak et al., 2012).  In this sample, the original form of the DRS-2 maintained 78.18% 
sensitivity and 86.21% specificity.  These rates were later compared with the sensitivity 
and specificity rates generated utilizing scores derived from the new weighting, or 
scoring, algorithm.  The steps outlined below provide a detailed description of how the 
newly weighted DRS-2 subscale scores were derived. 
The initial weighting of the subscales is presented in Table 2.  A comparative 
display of the new weights generated by the logistic regression analysis is presented in 
Table 7.  The log odds values obtained from the unstandardized regression equation 
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served as the new weights for the re-weighted subscale scores, replacing the original 
weighting values shown in the center column of Table 2.  New scores were computed by 
multiplying the total number of questions per subscale by the associated unstandardized 
logit for each subscale.  As shown in the bottom row of Table 7, applying these weights 
generated a new total DRS-2 score of 31.19.  However, in order for sensitivity analytic 
comparisons to be made between the two different scoring methods, these re-weighted 
values were then put back on the same metric, with a total possible DRS-2 score of 144 
utilizing the equations displayed in Table 8.  Once the new total possible subscale scores 
were computed, original raw subscale scores were then re-weighted and converted to 
new, logit-weighted scores on the same metric.  The equations are presented below. 
 
To compute the new metric-consistent and logit-weighted subscale scores, 
NewMEMScore = (OriginalMEMRawScore *NewMEMTotalPossibleScore) 
/OriginalMEMTotalPossibleScore             (2) 
NewIPScore = (OriginalIPRawScore *NewIPTotalPossibleScore) 
/OriginalIPTotalPossibleScore             (3) 
NewCONCScore = (OriginalCONCRawScore *NewCONCTotalPossibleScore) 
/OriginalCONCTotalPossibleScore             (4) 
NewATTScore = (OriginalATTRawScore *NewATTTotalPossibleScore) 
/OriginalATTTotalPossibleScore             (5) 
NewCONSTScore = (OriginalCONSTRawScore 
*NewCONSTTotalPossibleScore) /OriginalCONSTTotalPossibleScore        (6) 
 
I then calculated the new logit-weighted total raw score for each participant in the 
sample by adding each of the new subscale raw logit-scores.  Through these calculations, 
the logit-weighted total possible score was then consistent with the original DRS-2 total 
possible score (i.e., total 144 possible points).  Utilizing the newly computed logit-
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weighted total scores for the participants, I calculated a second, comparative sensitivity 
analysis to answer my second research question (i.e., Will statistically-weighted subscale 
scores improve the sensitivity of the DRS-2?).  Again, I counted the total number of true 
positive, false positive, true negative, and false negative cases.  Figure 2 presents a 
summary of these values.  Utilizing the same recommended 123 cut score as before, I 
calculated sensitivity and specificity rates for the new logit-weighted total DRS-2 scores.  
In this sample, the logit-weighted scores of the DRS-2 maintained 90.90% sensitivity and 
74.14% specificity.  This represented a 12.72% increase in sensitivity and a 12.07% 
decrease in specificity.  Despite the drop in specificity, the increased sensitivity of the 
measure by utilizing the statistically derived subscale weights provided support for my 
second hypothesis that the logit-weighted scores would increase the sensitivity of the 
measure to detecting cognitive deficit associated with dementia. 
VI: Discussion 
6.1 Primary Hypotheses 
The first goal of this study was to examine the relative contribution of each of the 
five DRS-2 subscales to predicting AD diagnosis.  Partial support for my first hypothesis 
was revealed from the logistic regression analysis.  Results revealed the following rank 
ordering, from greatest to least importance, of the DRS-2 subscales to predicting AD 
diagnosis: Memory, Initiation/Perseveration, Conceptualization, Attention, and 
Construction.  These results differed from my initial hypothesis such that Attention 
ranked as the fourth subscale of greatest importance, as opposed to my predicted fifth and 
least contributing subscale in terms of relative unique utility per my initial hypothesis.  It 
is possible that the items within any of the five subscales tapped into the assessment of 
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additional cognitive abilities, above and beyond the construct intended for assessment 
within the particular subscale.  For example, the Attention subscale may have tapped into 
other areas of cognition, such as motor coordination, language abilities, and working 
memory.  With language abilities being one of the earlier cognitive functions affected by 
Alzheimer’s disease early on in the diagnosis, it is possible that this could explain the 
statistical rank ordering of this subscale as the fourth greatest contributor to the model 
containing all five DRS-2 subscales.  According to the description provided in the DRS-2 
professional manual, “both auditory-visual and verbal-nonverbal tasks of attention are 
presented” in the Attention subscale (Jurica et al., 2001).  However, one of the eight tasks 
within this section is digit span backward, which requires the test-taker to hold a 
sequence of numbers in his or her head before repeating them in reverse order to the 
person administering and scoring the test.  Digit span backward is generally understood 
as a test of working memory, as it requires active mental manipulation of information 
(Emrani, Libon, Lamar, Price, Jefferson, Gifford… & Au, 2018).  In a recent study 
conducted by Emrani et al. (2018), the authors report that MCI patients displayed an 
attenuation of a recency effect when administered the digit span backward test, compared 
to normal controls without evidence of cognitive deficit.  This suggests that patients in 
the AD group were likely scoring well below the patients in the MCI group on this 
particular task within the subscale, due to the continued neurodegenerative effects 
associated with Alzheimer’s disease progression.  Therefore, this may have introduced an 
additional amount of variability into the subscale scores, which may have resulted in the 
rank ordering of this predictor as the fourth greatest contributing model, relative to the 
other predictors in the model. 
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6.2 Secondary Hypotheses 
The second goal of this study was to compare the sensitivity and specificity rates 
of the logit-weighted DRS-2 total scores to the sensitivity and specificity rates of the 
original DRS-2 total scores, when utilizing the recommended 123/144 cut score as a 
criterion.  Analyses revealed that the logit-weighted DRS-2 scoring method yielded a 
higher sensitivity compared to the original version of the DRS-2, such that the sensitivity 
of the measure increased by 12.72%.  In contrast, analyses revealed that the logit-
weighted DRS-2 scores yielded a lower specificity compared to the original DRS-2 
scores, such that specificity rates decreased by a 12.07% using the logit-weighted scores.  
The decrease in specificity may be attributable to the increased weighting of subscales 
testing areas of cognition that are reliably reported to distinguish cognitive deficit 
associated with a diagnosis of AD dementia and individuals not diagnosed with dementia, 
such as Memory.  Increasing the weighting of the subscales of highest importance likely 
dropped the scores on these subscales for the initial false negative cases, resulting in re-
weighted scores below 123, and therefore accurately re-classifying these cases as true 
positives.  The decrease in specificity may be due to the increased range of the 
distribution of total points possible across subscales.  In the original form of the DRS-2, 
the total possible points across subscales ranged from 6 to 39 points.  In the re-weighted 
version of the DRS-2, the total possible points across subscales ranged from 
approximately 8 to 51.  The difference between the total possible subscale points between 
the highest and lowest weighted subscales differed by 33 points in original DRS-2.  In 
comparison, in the logit-weighted DRS-2, this difference increased to 43 points.  The 
range of these differences may have affected the calculated specificity of the two scoring 
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methods of comparison, as narrowness generally lends itself to increased ability for 
unique identification of cases of interest.  
6.3 Limitations 
Several statistical limitations must be considered when interpreting the results 
from this study.  The logistic regression analysis was underpowered due to small group 
sample sizes, which likely upwardly biased the produced parameter estimates and inflated 
the associated standard errors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  Conventional 
recommendations indicate a minimum sample of 60 participants within each of the two 
groups (AD, MCI), resulting in a total sample size of 120 participants.  This 
determination of the minimum sample size was based on the recommendations proposed 
by Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holdord, and Feinstein (1996) that logistic regression 
analyses should contain a minimum of ten observations per parameter estimate.  The 
logistic regression equation for the current study included six total parameter estimates: 
one estimate associated with the intercept in the equation and one estimate per each of the 
five DRS-2 subscales (See Formula 1). 
Additionally, the standard errors associated with the logistic regression 
coefficients may be biased due to the moderate degree of shared variability among all 
five of the predictors in the model, as indicated by the values of the intercorrelations 
among the predictors presented in Table 5.  For example, moderate degrees of overlap 
were evident among the following pairings of predictors: Memory and 
Initiation/Perseveration, Memory and Conceptualization, Conceptualization and 
Education, Initiation/Perseveration and Education, Initiation/Perseveration and Attention, 
and Initiation/Perseveration and Conceptualization.  These findings further support the 
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results presented by Marcopulos et al. (1997) highlighting the effect of education on 
neuropsychological test scores, as displayed by the positive relationship between four out 
of the five DRS-2 subscale predictors and education level.  The exception to this finding 
was the Attention subscale, which revealed a small negative correlation with education 
level.  Although likely trivial in nature, it is possible that this, too, could be due to the 
possibility that the items within the Attention subscale tap into additional cognitive 
abilities, as previously mentioned. 
It is also important to note that, although the correlations were small, each of the 
predictors, with the exception of Conceptualization, was negatively correlated with age.  
This is finding is consistent with the literature supporting a decrease in cognitive function 
with increasing age.  Additionally, it is important to note that the AD group participants 
were slightly older than the MCI group participants.  Taken together with the results of 
the primary and secondary hypotheses, this provides support for decreased functioning 
across cognitive domains for AD patients.  The DRS-2 testing manual describes that the 
Conceptualization subscale is designed to assess “the ability to abstract, that is, to induce 
similarities and detect differences among verbal and visual stimuli” (Jurica et al., 2001).  
Due to the combination of verbal and non-verbal abilities, as well as concrete and 
abstract reasoning abilities that are assessed within the Conceptualization subscale, it is 
possible that the items better represent several different, unique constructs, as opposed to 
one, larger construct that was labeled “Conceptualization.”  This may have decreased the 
internal consistency of this particular subscale due to potential variability in what is being 
assessed, and therefore may explain the small negative correlation with age reported in 
this study. 
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Furthermore, the overlap among the predictors may have attenuated the effect of 
the unique contribution of the overlapping predictors to the outcome, given the other 
predictors in the model.  Ultimately, this could have resulted in the non-significance of 
individual predictors as well as attenuated effect sizes associated with the predictors that 
shared a greater amount of variance with other predictors in the model (Cohen et al., 
2003). 
Another limitation of this study is the lack of collection of item-level information 
in the archival database used for the analyses.  Without item-level information, I was 
unable to examine reliability of the DRS-2 in the current sample, and therefore was 
unable to examine for the presence of measurement error.  Measurement error in the 
predictors is associated with downward bias of the associated individual regression 
coefficients (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  Measurement error is also associated with an 
inflation of the standard errors associated with the individual regression coefficients, as 
well as inflation of the standard errors of the outcome (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
Practical limitations must also be considered when interpreting these results.  It is 
important to note that the DRS-2 was administered within the comprehensive evaluation 
that was part of the initial diagnostic workup process for all participants.  Therefore, the 
DRS-2 testing information was available and utilized in conjunction with other cognitive 
tests administered during the flexible comprehensive test battery as well as with all other 
available information at the time of testing to make a clinical diagnosis of MCI or 
dementia.  Although there were many other factors considered during the diagnostic 
workup for these patients, the use of the DRS-2 introduces a source of bias due to the 
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presence of some degree of circular reasoning into the results of the study, as the 
diagnoses were not completely independent of the test scores used for analyses. 
A second notable limitation of this study pertains to the cut score used and the use 
of MCI participants as a control, or comparison, group.  The use of the 123/144 
recommended cut score to classify participants may not have been appropriate, as this cut 
score was created utilizing the original weights applied to the DRS-2 subscale scores.  
Therefore, it is possible that a different cut score may be deemed more appropriate for 
use if a normative study were to implement a logit-based weighting algorithm to derive 
new DRS-2 scores.  Additionally, it is important to note that this original 123/144 cut 
score was not developed to distinguish between levels of cognitive deficit associated with 
dementia and MCI. Instead, it was developed to distinguish cognitive deficit indicative of 
dementia relative to a normal controls, or persons with no evidence of abnormal cognitive 
impairment.  Therefore, the use of this cut score in the current study may not have been 
appropriate, and may have introduced bias into the sensitivity/specificity comparisons of 
the two scoring methods.  Furthermore, the unstandardized beta weights generated from 
logistic regression equation in which the MCI group served as the non-case group will 
likely differ from the unstandardized beta weights that would be generated from a logistic 
regression equation in which a normative sample served as the non-case group.  Future 
research should be conducted to investigate these differences and the effect of statistical 
weighting procedures using a true normative comparison group. 
Additionally, I was unable to control for individual differences on a number of 
factors that may have influenced cognitive performance.  For example, the archival 
database utilized for this study did not contain information regarding comorbid medical 
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conditions.  It is possible that DRS-2 scores may have been influenced by the presence of 
another medical condition, such as depression or anxiety.  Therefore, it is possible that 
low scores did not solely reflect deficits associated with AD or MCI.  Specifically, poor 
cognitive performance may have been exacerbated by the presence of one or more 
coexisting medical conditions, or instead may have been better explained by a 
comorbidity altogether. 
The inability to control testing conditions across participants poses another 
limitation to this study.  Specifically, it is highly unlikely that the same person 
administered and scored the DRS-2 to all participants included in this study.  
Additionally, the DRS-2 testing data was obtained for each participant during his or her 
initial diagnostic work up at the clinic via administration of a flexible neuropsychological 
battery.  Therefore, the order of the administration of the tests included within each 
unique battery may have differed, meaning that the DRS-2 may have been administered 
to each participant at different times within the evaluation.  This may have influenced 
participant performance on the DRS-2 due to potential differences in the levels of testing 
fatigue among participants who may have been administered the test in the beginning of 
the battery in comparison to participants who may have been administered the DRS-2 at 
the end of the battery.  It may have been possible that participants who were administered 
the test towards the end of the battery performed more poorly than those who were 
administered at the beginning of the battery, if the ordering of testing administration did, 
in fact, differ.  Additionally, participants who may have been administered the DRS-2 at 
the end of the battery may have performed more poorly on the test than they would have 
if they were administered the test at the beginning of the battery. 
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Another limitation of the study is the use of clinical diagnosis to classify 
participant group membership.  Currently, the only way to confirm a diagnosis of AD is 
through post-mortem biological analysis.  Reports of AD biomarkers were not included 
in the dataset and I was therefore unable to determine that biomarkers were utilized in 
conjunction with the results of the comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation to 
inform clinical diagnosis.  Therefore, this remains a limitation of this study. 
6.4 Potential Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
The results from this study contribute to the current literature seeking to identify 
reliable differences in impairment across cognitive domains that best discriminate 
patients diagnosed with AD and MCI.  Specifically, tasks within the DRS-2 Memory and 
Initiation/Perseveration subscales statistically significantly discriminated between AD 
and MCI groups.  This is consistent with a diagnosis of dementia, which is characterized 
by insidious onset and gradual decline objectively evident in two or more cognitive 
domains (McKhann et al., 2011).  Furthermore, prior research suggests that cognitive 
decline is seen in these areas much earlier on in the disease process (Karantzoulis & 
Galvin, 2011; Lezak et al., 2012; Schoenberg & Duff, 2011;).  Therefore, performance on 
tasks assessing these areas of cognition often progressively declines as a result.  On the 
DRS-2, was evident by the binary statistically significantly lower performance of the AD 
group in comparison to the MCI group on the Memory and Initiation/Perseveration 
subscales, such that the differences then contributed to the model at the multivariate 
level.  However, additional research allowing for analysis at the item-level analysis is 
needed in order to investigate the utility of specific tasks within the discriminating 
subscales to separate the two groups.  For example, delayed recall is the most reliable 
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indicator of cognitive deficit associated with AD dementia (Karantzoulis, & Galvin, 
2011; McKhann et al., 2011; Schoenberg & Duff, 2011).  Therefore, it would be expected 
that this particular task, which is housed within the Memory subscale of the DRS-2, 
would hold much more weight in discriminating persons with AD dementia from persons 
without AD dementia.  Unfortunately, item-level information was not recorded in the 
archival database and was therefore unable to be analyzed.  Future researchers should 
consider expanding beyond this limitation of the current study and continue to explore 
the utility of individual tasks within brief screening measures of cognition to 
discriminating between AD dementia and non-AD dementia participant groups. 
Additionally, results support previous research highlighting the importance of 
weighting procedures, therefore warranting increased consideration from test developers 
and clinicians when creating new measures, modifying pre-existing measures, and 
selecting measures for use across various clinical populations.  These results highlight 
that the use of alternative weights may improve classification rates, which warrants 
additional consideration in the research and clinical fields.  Additional research is needed 
to see if the results of the current study replicate across diverse demographic populations 
as well as in bigger sample sizes of both AD and MCI participants and AD and normal 
controls. 
Future research is needed to investigate the utility of statistically driven weighting 
methods in other clinical samples as well to test for consistency in the results reported in 
the current study across clinical populations.  It is possible that differential scoring 
algorithms for different clinical populations may further increase the utility of screening 
tests.  Optimally weighted cognitive screening measures may better, or more accurately 
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inform physicians when making decisions regarding patient treatment.  It is not to be 
implied that screening tests should replace the administration of comprehensive 
neuropsychological batteries, as screening tests are utilized for completely different 
purposes than comprehensive evaluations.  However, the results of this study do suggest 
that there is room to further improve upon pre-existing cognitive screening measures and 
test development procedures in the field of neuropsychology.  
Directing efforts towards increasing the sensitivity of these brief cognitive 
screening instruments also warrants consideration of the use of appropriate cut scores.  
Many cut scores are derived at the time of measurement construction, or only shortly 
after.  For example, the most frequently referenced cut score for the DRS_2 was created 
in the 1970s.  Moving forward, a re-evaluation of standard setting procedures used to 
determine these cut scores may be necessary.  Specifically, the results of this study 
highlight the differential effects of subscale scores on patient classification utilizing the 
123 recommended cut score.  Despite the limitation of using this cut score for 
comparison of the new scoring algorithm, although it was derived from the original 
scoring method, this study highlights the need for consideration of standard setting within 
specific domains of cognition instead of across all cognitive domains being assessed.  
More specifically, it may make more sense to set standards within each appropriately 
defined cognitive domain (i.e., memory) and to make domain-specific cut score 
comparisons to provide physicians administering these brief screening measures of 
cognition with more specific information to make more informed referral decisions.  
Cross validation studies are needed in future research in order to examine the 
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generalizability of standard setting and content-related validity evidence across 
independent samples. 
The results from this study highlight the need for statistical consideration to be 
given during and reported as a part of the measurement development process.  This study 
provides an example of the ways in which alterations to statistical weights of sub-
components of a measure can affect the utility of the test.  Although this study presents a 
new statistically generated scoring algorithm for the DRS-2, at this time, I do not 
recommend the use of population-specific regression-based scoring algorithms in clinical 
practice.  The current study only investigated the effects of utilizing a regression-based 
scoring algorithm on one particular clinical population of interest.  Therefore, these 
results would be different across different clinical populations, resulting in the generation 
of different weights across these different populations.  It is unclear to what extent these 
weights would differ across persons with different types of dementias and it is also 
unclear if similar results would be found using a different kind of statistical weighting 
technique other than logistic regression.  However, this current study highlights the need 
for additional research into the aforementioned possibilities.  If future research supports 
the results of this current study, the development of alternative scoring methods may have 
important clinical implications, as the use of new methods may further improve detection 
of cognitive deficit associated with abnormal aging and decline.  However, this would 
first require the cross-validation of these findings in order to better understand the 
generalizability of these findings across many independent samples. 
Instead, at this time, a more appropriate recommendation is made for test 
developers to consider these factors when designing new instruments and to consider the 
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effects of these decisions on measurement sensitivity and specificity rates.  For example, 
sensitivity is frequently valued in brief cognitive screening tests from a clinical 
perspective, as the pros of a false positive result (i.e., obtaining a baseline full 
neuropsychological assessment for future comparative purposes) outweigh the cons of 
obtaining a false positive result (i.e., utilization of time and financial resources).  In other 
words, these measures should aim to minimize Type II error, as the intent of use of these 
brief cognitive screening measures is ultimately to increase the identification of deficit 
associated with abnormal aging (i.e., dementia).   Consequently, this results in an increase 
in Type I error for these measures, although this type of error is of much less concerning 
in the brief screening setting, due to the push to increase referrals for a full diagnostic 
workup via comprehensive neuropsychological testing, if deemed appropriate.  It is 
important to consider the detrimental effects of committing a Type I error when 
diagnosing dementia, as persons diagnosed with dementia are at increased risk for suicide 
(Draper, Peisah, Snowdon, & Brodaty, 2010).  Research suggests that this risk increases 
for patients diagnosed with dementia during hospitalization, which is a common location 
in which these brief cognitive screening measures are administered (Erlangsen, Zarit, & 
Conwell, 2008).  Although brief cognitive screening measures are not used independently 
to diagnose dementia, it is important that professionals administering these tests and 
making referral decisions for diagnostic workups clearly communicate the implications of 
the results of brief cognitive testing to the patient.  Furthermore, professionals must 
remain aware of the increased risk of suicide, as even the referral for a diagnostic workup 
based on the results of the brief testing can be devastating to the patient.   Preventive 
measures focusing on suicidal ideation must remain a focal point of patient care during 
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both the screening and diagnostic processes, especially when administering tests with 
increased levels of sensitivity.   
Ultimately, these results suggest that there may be room for improvement of the 
utility of brief screening tests of cognition for dementia in older adults.  Increasing the 
sensitivity of these brief cognitive screening measure for dementia would serve as a great 
contribution to the worldwide push for increased screening and assessment of cognitive 
abilities in older adults to allow for earlier detection of deficit associated with abnormal 
cognitive aging, such as MCI or AD.  Increasing the ability of these measures to better 
detect cognitive deficit associated with abnormal aging in this population would 
indirectly result in increased referrals for full neuropsychological evaluations, which 
would subsequently result in the implementation of earlier treatment planning. 
One cannot ignore the plethora of literature highlighting the effect of early 
intervention and treatment planning on increased quality of life in adults with cognitive 
impairment (Appels & Scherder, 2010; Giebel et al., 2014; Liu-Seifert et al., 2014).  
Should the results of the current study be replicated across different samples and clinical 
populations, this study may be among the first providing an alternative way of 
accomplishing that goal of expanding and improving upon currently existing early 
detection methods, which could potentially serve to be greatly beneficial to the healthcare 
industry. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of DRS-2 Subscale Items and Scores 
Subscale # Questions Relative %  # Points       Relative %    
ATT         8                 22            37             25 
MEM         5                 13            25             17 
I/P        11                 30            37             25 
CONCEP         6                 16            39             27 
CONST         6                 16  6   4 
Total        36                100          144           100 
Note. ATT = Attention. MEM = Memory. I/P = Initiation/Perseveration. CONCEP = 
Conceptualization. CONST = Construction. 
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Table 2 
Original DRS-2 Subscale Weights 
Subscale # Qs x Logit Weight = # Total Pts 
ATT 8 x 4.63 = 37 
I/P 11 x 3.36 = 37 
CONC 6 x 6.50 = 39 
MEM 5 x 5.00 = 25 
CONST 6 x 1.00 = 6 
Total  36 – – – 144 
Note. ATT = DRS-2 Attention subscale. I/P = DRS-2 Initiation/Perseveration subscale. 
CONCEPT = DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale. MEM = DRS-2 Memory subscale. 
CONST = DRS-2 Construction subscale. 
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Table 3                 
Means and Standard Deviations of Demographic Variables   
  AD 
(n = 55) 
  MCI 
(n = 58) 
  Total 
(N = 113) 
Variable M SD   M SD     M SD 
Age (yrs.)* 79.00 6.12   76.81 5.17   77.88 5.73 
Education (yrs.) 14.95 3.10   14.91 3.29   14.93 3.19 
Note: * Statistically significant group differences (p > .05, independent samples t-test). 
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Table 4                 
Means and Standard Deviations of Predictors as a Function of Group   
  AD 
(n = 55) 
 MCI 
(n = 58) 
 Total 
(N = 113) 
Predictor M SD  M SD    M SD 
ATT 31.84 3.65  33.76 2.75    32.82 3.35 
I/P 29.44 6.11  34.36 3.237    31.96 5.43 
CONC 33.24 4.12  35.62 2.72    34.46 3.66 
MEM 15.05 3.03  20.76 3.03    17.98 4.16 
CONST 5.58 0.81  5.83 0.60    5.71 0.72 
Note. ATT = DRS-2 Attention subscale. I/P = DRS-2 Initiation/Perseveration subscale. 
CONC = DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale. MEM = DRS-2 Memory subscale. CONST 
= DRS-2 Construction subscale.  AD = Alzheimer’s disease.  MCI = Mild Cognitive 
Impairment. 
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Table 5  
Intercorrelations for Demographic and Predictor Variables   
Variable Age Education ATT I/P CONCEP MEM CONST 
Age 1.0       
Education .09 1.0      
ATT -.02 -.04 1.0     
I/P -.07 .20* .25** 1.0    
CONC -.09 .34* .11 .22* 1.0   
MEM -.13 .17 .16 .39** .27** 1.0  
CONST .02 .14 .13 .03 .15 .13 1.0 
Note. ATT = DRS-2 Attention subscale. I/P = DRS-2 Initiation/Perseveration subscale. 
CONC = DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale. MEM = DRS-2 Memory subscale. CONST 
= DRS-2 Construction subscale. 
* p < .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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Table 6 
 
Full Model Logistic Regression Analysis Summary  
Variable b SE 95% CI Wald df p OR 95% CI 
ATT .171 6.295 [-.019, .362] 3.096 1 .078 1.187 [.981, 1.436] 
I/P .186 .097 [.038, .336] 6.086 1 .014 1.204 [1.039, 1.396] 
CONC .157 .102 [-.042, .356] 2.406 1 .121 1.171 [.959, 1.428] 
MEM .495 .100 [.299, .692] 24.383 1 .000 1.641 [1.348, 1.998] 
CONST .408 .387 [-.351, 1.167] 1.110 1 .292 1.504 [.704, 3.213] 
Constant -28.192 6.295 – 20.058 1 – – – 
Note. ATT = DRS-2 Attention subscale. I/P = DRS-2 Initiation/Perseveration subscale. 
CONC = DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale. MEM = DRS-2 Memory subscale. CONST 
= DRS-2 Construction subscale. Constant = Intercept. 
  
  
70 
Table 7 
Application of Logit-Based DRS-2 Subscale Weighting Algorithm 
Subscale # Qs x Logit Weight = # Total Pts 
ATT 8 x .573 = 4.584 
I/P 11 x 1.008 = 11.088 
CONC 6 x .576 = 3.456 
MEM 5 x 2.062 = 10.31 
CONST 6 x 0.292 = 1.752 
Total 36 – – – 31.19 
Note. ATT = DRS-2 Attention subscale. I/P = DRS-2 Initiation/Perseveration subscale. 
CONC = DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale. MEM = DRS-2 Memory subscale. CONST 
= DRS-2 Construction subscale. 
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Table 8 
Calculation of Metric-Consistent Newly Computed DRS-2 Subscale Scores 
Version Subscale # Pts / Tot Scr = Subscale % x Tot Scr = Weighted Tot 
Original CONC 39 / 144 = .2708 – – – – 
 ATT 37 / 144 = .2569 – – – – 
 I/P 37 / 144 = .1736 – – – – 
 MEM 25 / 144 = .2569 – – – – 
 CONST 6 / 144 = .0416 – – – – 
 Total 144 – – – – – – – – 
Weighted CONC 3.456 / 31.19 = .1108 x 144 = 15.96 
 ATT 4.584 / 31.19 = .1470 x 144 = 21.16 
 I/P 11.088 / 31.19 = .3555 x 144 = 51.20 
 MEM 10.31 / 31.19 = .3306 x 144 = 47.60 
 CONST 1.752 / 31.19 = .0562 x 144 = 8.09 
 Total 31.19 – – – – – – – 144 
Note. ATT = DRS-2 Attention subscale. I/P = DRS-2 Initiation/Perseveration subscale. 
CONCEPT = DRS-2 Conceptualization subscale. MEM = DRS-2 Memory subscale. 
CONST = DRS-2 Construction subscale. 
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Figure 1. Summary of Original DRS-2 Sensitivity-Specificity Analysis 
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Figure 2. Summary of Logit-Weighted DRS-2 Sensitivity-Specificity Analysis 
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